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Abstract 
This Thesis addresses problems of Multi-period Re-investment Cooperative 
Games, focusing on how to select portfolio and how to allocate the returns 
among all the investors. Re-investment mechanism leads to Dynamic Style 
models. So we make an assumption that investors can borrow money at a 
high interest rate r to meet the project money requirement. We prove that 
different models, such as models with stochastic returns and stochastic project 
prices, have non-empty cores. Moreover, besides cases without risk measures 
in utility functions, models with specific risk measures, for example, loo and li 
also have at least an allocation rule to separate the returns among investors. 
For models with stochastic investors' budgets, we prove the balancedness by 
adding "imaginary players". We analyze specific models, give two O(m^) time 
complexity algorithms for two different two period examples and use the al-
gorithms to find marginal effects. Finally, we use numerical tests to find the 
heuristic rules of models with more than two periods. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction and Literature 
Review 
1.1 Introduction 
Portfolio Selection problems have been interesting to scholars and investors 
for a long time. With multiple investors, a multi-period investment problem 
has two research aspects. The first aspect is about how to select portfolio 
so that investors could get the most returns from limited amount of capital. 
The second aspect is about how to allocate the returns to the investors who 
contribute their budgets to the portfolio in order to make cooperation possi-
ble. In general, the first stream is about optimization while the second one is 
about cooperative game problems. Moreover, a multi-period problem may also 
involve re-investment issue, which means that the investors can not only use 
the current budgets, but also use the returns generated from previous stages 
into the following investment periods. 
In the following parts of the section, we firstly show the background and 
some motivating examples of our problems. Secondly, we introduce some basic 
concepts about cooperative games and linear programming. We give an outline 
of the whole thesis at the end of the section. 
1 . 
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1.1.1 Background and Motivating examples 
There are many good examples for the Multi-period Re-investment Cooper-
ative Game problems. We firstly use Hong Kong Real Estate Market as our 
target. In Hong Kong, many real estate projects are conducted in two or more 
stages. For instances, the "Shatin New Town Plaza" mainly consists of three 
stages, Phase I, finished in 1984，Royal Park Hotel, finished in 1989 and Phase 
III which was finished in 1991. Another example is the "Lok Pu Plaza", which 
was previously called "Lok Fu Shopping Center". "Lok Fu Plaza" does not 
have only one construction stage, either. "Lok Fu Plaza" has Phase I, opened 
by Sir John Henry Bremridge in 1985 and Phase II’ finished in 1991. 
Not only did these projects involve multi-period investment, they also 
shared one similarity - reinvestment mechanism. Investors use their controlled 
money as well as the money generated from the previous stages into following 
. stages. We still take the example of "Shatin New Town Plaza". After leas-
ing half of the business area of the Phase I to "Yaohan", a famous Japanese 
. department store decades ago, the main owner of "Shatin New Town Plaza", 
Sun Hung Kai Group collected a big amount of capital, especially after the 
opening of Shatin KCR Station. Then Sun Hung Kai Group used these money 
and other investment resources to build the Royal Park Hotel. Along with the 
�� development of Hong Kong's tourism and business, Royal Park Hotel made a 
great profit. The same story happened again before the Phase III was started 
.. to build. We can also reasonably deduct that Sun Hung Kai Group had to 
collect or even to borrow more money to finish Phase III if Royal Park Hotel 
did not generate the target profits. 
Along with development of Real Estate market and the Finance market, big 
projects are not necessarily owned by only one investor. Small investors can 
cooperate and use their total budget as a whole to invest. Asset Securitization 
especially helps small investors to cooperate because they do not even need to 
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invest the whole project, but just a part of. Motivated by the above example, 
we designed and did research on the Multi-period Cooperative Re-investment 
Game models. 
As a matter of fact, a lot of current business models also use the principles of 
re-investing and cooperating together. For example, the Sports Industry. The 
soccer leagues in Europe countries have been interesting for investors for about 
seven years since Russian investor Roman Arkadievich Abramovich bought 
all the shares of Chelsea Football Club in 2003 ([20]). During recent years, 
Chelsea FC invested heavily on soccer stars all over the world and brought 
them to London. These investments do not only base on Abramovich's capital 
but also base on a smart and aggressive business model. After collecting 
the best soccer players, Chelsea FC have won 3 Premier League Champions, 
2 Football Association Cups and other champions that Chelsea, FC haven't 
achieved for decades. More importantly, these champions brought much bonus 
that can be used for subsequent investments. At the same time, the soccer 
stars do not just play soccer in Stanford Bridge Stadium, they also allow 
Chelsea FC to sell soccer fan products, such as clothes and boots, which also 
generate a huge amount of revenue for future use. By following the above 
business model, Abramovich has made Chelsea FC a strong soccer team in the 
Premier League and in the Champions League. Here "strong" has two folds 
of meanings, athletically strong and financially strong. On the other hand, 
seeing the success of Abramovich, many investors plan to copy it. However, 
since the investments involve huge amounts of capital, it is not an easy action 
for a single investor. So some investors choose to cooperate. For example, 
American investors Hicks and Gillett cooperated to invest on another England 
soccer team- Liverpool Football Club. Using the similar business of model of 
Chelsea FC, Liverpool FC also made some big success stories, for example, 
winning the most important champion in Europe- the Champion League Cup 
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in 2005. 
Another example of cooperation is Barcelona FC although it follows a dif-
ferent model. Barcelona. FC is owned not by one single investor, but by a 
group of people- the "members". After the board of Barcelona FC decides to 
make an investment, such as buying a soccer star, the chairman asks financial 
support from the members. Since the investment is huge and a single member 
does not have the enough capital, all members are needed. The members are 
huge fans of Barcelona FC, perhaps for generations. Although not a universal 
business model, the method Barcelona FC follows is a good combination of 
re-investing and cooperation. 
For further applications, models of multi-period cooperative re-investment 
games may also have practical value in other fields. For example, environment 
protection and carbon management. Environmental issues are definitely multi-
period issues. Developing countries do not hope that only developed countries 
can get involved in investments on environment protection projects. Although 
not with sufficient capital, developing countries may have more money years 
later. If both sides cooperate, not only more money can be collected, but also it 
brings more harmony to the world community to let every country contribute 
its strength. 
\N 
1.1.2 Basic Concepts 
.. Before we move forward to the literature review part and main problems, some 
basic concepts need to be stated clearly. 
Suppose there are n players in the biggest set N and the objective func-
tion of any subset S C N is v{S), then we can define a cooperative game 
G(N,v). Unlike non-cooperative games balanced by Nash Equilibrium ([9]), 
a cooperative game is a competition among coalitions of players, rather than 
among individuals. If the biggest subset ” N” wins the competition, namely 
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the grand coalition can be formed, we say that the cooperative game G{N, v) 
has a non-empty core. 
How do we define the "competition"? The competition is defined to be the 
one on abilities to better off all the players in the coalition, namely there is 
an allocation rule that can make all the players in the coalition not willing to 
leave. For the grand coalition N, an allocation rule satisfying the following is 
called in the core: 
= v{N) andYyil^j�S):iS (1.1) 
ieN ies 
Here Ui is the allocation to player i E N. Intuitively this allocation rule 
can make sure that none of the players in the grand coalition has incentives to 
leave. 
Taking an example, we assume that in the game there are three players, 
player 1, player 2, player 3 and one project which can generate revenue 3 dollar. 
It is only that three players cooperate that can make the project done. So here 
we have: 
v{N) = 3 and v{S) =0,\/SCN (1.2) 
So the following allocation is in the core: 
Ui =U2 = U3 = l (1.3) 
However, the core does not need to be unique, the following allocation is 
still in the core: 
ui = 3,U2 = Us = 0 (1.4) 
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As a matter of fact, any allocation satisfying the following rule is in the 
core: 
< 3 , 0 < U 2 < ( 3 - ui), 0 < U3 < (3 - - U2) (1.5) 
Most of the models in this thesis are Linear Programming problems (LP 
problems). LP problems can be solved by Simplex Method. However, simplex 
method does not have the best time complexity performance in the worst case 
study. Interior Point Algorithm ([10]) has time complexity in solving 
LP problems. Since LP problems are definitely solvable, Linear Production 
Games have non-empty core. This finding by Owen ([15]) will be introduced 
again in the later literature review part. 
1.1.3 Outline of the thesis 
The outline of our thesis is as follows: 
- The second part of Chapter 1 is the literature review. We review previous 
research works from many directions, for example, optimizing the portfolio, 
finding the allocation rule and research applications. 
In Chapter 2, we establish basic assumptions and notations for the basic 
“ model: Multi-period Cooperative Re-investment Games. Depending on the 
range and the nature of portfolio variable x, We further give three streams of 
“ the basic model and point out that only sub-model III possibly has non-empty 
core in the next Chapter. 
Chapter 3 also studies the sub-model III and develops an allocation rule 
which is the core of the cooperative games G{N,v) with proof. 
In Chapter 4’ we develop an algorithm with time complexity O(m^) for the 
dual problem of a specific two-period case. 
In chapter 5’ other extensions of the basic model are studied. For example, 
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the models with stochastic project prices and stochastic budgets also have non-
empty cores. For another specific two-period example, we develop an algorithm 
with time complexity 0{m?) for the dual problem. An interesting marginal 
effect is also pointed out. 
Chapter 6 studies models with risks involved. We prove the non-empty 
core of models with l^ o and l\ risk measure. 
Chapter 7 is about numerical tests. Although without theoretical proof, we 
use numerical tests to study the heuristic rules of our models with 3 periods. 
In the end, we give some conclusive remarks, giving a summary and pointing 
out the future research directions. 
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1.2 Literature Review 
Portfolio Selection Problems have a long history in the management science 
research field. The foundation work is by Nobel Prize Laureate Harry M. 
Markowitz ([13]). His paper not only considers the objectives of expected 
returns but also uses risks as an additional measure. The concept of "efficient 
frontier" started to become popular in many Economics Text books. But 
Markowitz's work only addresses the problems of a single period. Moreover, 
regarding risks, the measure that Markowitz used is not always applicable 
for real investors. Cai et al.([3]) developed an analytical solution to portfolio 
optimization problems under the loo risk measure which has special application 
for investors who avoid huge risks among all the projects. We also call this 
risk measure the minimax rule. Some scholars, such as Deng et al.([6]) and 
Zhou et a ! ([21]) followed this research path and solved portfolio problems with 
“ minimax rules. More importantly, Zhou et al. addresses problems of multi-
period cooperative games theory. The problems in their paper has neither 
‘ only one investor nor only one period. The investors cooperate to invest on 
projects and then allocate the returns by an all-better-off rule. Zhou's work is 
especially interesting because the combination of optimization and cooperative 
games theory is of much research value and practical value. 
�� Shapley introduced many important concepts of cooperative games theory 
in his foundation work ([16]). For example, the concept of core as introduced in 
” the last section. Another foundation work regarding cooperative games theory 
is the finding of non-emptyness of the core of Linear Production Games. This 
work is done by Owen([15]). Suppose that there are n players forming "N" 
and each player with resource vector k. Using LP programming, Owen proved 
that the cooperative game G(N,v) has a non-empty core. Here v{S) is defined 
as the optimal value of the following problem: 
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Maximize c • x 
s.t. Ax < bs 
x>0 
c, A are constant^ bs '•= Ylh (1.6) 
ies 
In other Cooperative game models, scholars try to find the methods to 
make a grand coalition possible. Charnes et al.([4]) studied the method to 
make the objection in the grand coalition as less as possible. The problems 
they studied on was about stochastic cooperative game, namely the realization 
of the actions are not deterministic. That is why the allocation set Charnes 
et al. defined was called "prior satisficing nucleolus". Tijs et al.([18]) intro-
duced four methods to allocate the group returns. They are: methods based on 
marginal costs; methods based on minimizing maximum unhappiness; methods 
based on separable and nonseparable costs; the cost gap allocation method. 
Tijs et aL mainly introduced the properties of the last method. Alkan et 
al.([l]) studied the criteria of justice for different cooperative games. But 
the problems they address are single period problems. Moreover, since they 
mainly consider indivisible goods allocation, the assumptions are quite strong. 
Lemaire ([12]) gave an summary on the application of cost allocation for real 
business. Lemaire also showed the theoretical essence of possible ways of allo-
cating costs. Hansen et al. ([7]) designed dynamic programming algorithm for 
partially observable stochastic games. They also gave an algorithm for a finite 
horizon partially observable cooperative games. However, the time complexity 
drastically increases along with the increase of the dimensions. So Hansen's 
algorithm only work for small problem. Gerd ([8]) had a summary on the DP 
approaches for solving asset allocation problems. But he didn't consider the 
curse of dimensionality nor the re-investment issues. 
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Suijs et al.([17]) introduced the definition of cooperative games with stochas-
tic payoffs. In comparison with the deterministic case, the allocation rule for 
stochastic case is as follows. 
E = E{v(N)) andJ2E{ui) > E{v{S))yS C N (1.7) 
ieN ies 
Here Ui is the stochastic variable allocated to player i. The realization of 
Ur does not have only one value. Moreover, v(N) and v{S) are also stochastic 
because the payoff vectors are stochastic. 
Bonn et al. ([2]) introduced the capital-deposit games in 2001. The prob-
lems they address are cooperations on investment of projects having term 
structures. They mainly summarized three sub-games. The structure based 
on investment length, investment amount and the mixture. Following Borm's 
work, Waegenaere et al. ([19]) studied the models with re-investment mech-
anisms. Apart from Zhou's work ([21]), Waegenaere's paper is mostly close 
to the research topic that this thesis studies. But Waegenaere et al. only 
considered the deterministic case. Moreover, they didn't consider risks. By 
using Owen's conclusion ([15]), Waegenaere concluded that Borm's models, 
if having deterministic return variables, has non-empty core even with re-
�� investment mechanism added. Focusing on the allocation of risks, Csoka et al. 
([5]) specifies standard terms for risk allocation games. He introduced 4 ax-
ioms of defining risks:.monotonicity, subadditivity, positive homogeneity and 
translation invariance. 




Re-investment Games: The 
Basic Model 
2.1 Basic settings and assumptions 
Consider a finite number T periods. A set of investors N = 1，2，...’ n want to 
enroll in the investment. Each investor i € A^  has a series of money available 
during those periods: 
Ck = (an,ai2, ...,aiT) G R?. (2.1) 
The budget an can be used for current investment or be kept for future use. 
For convenience, we assume that an is larger than 0 for all i and t and that 
the discount factor is 1. There is a set of investment projects M = 1,2, ...,m. 
Each investment project j e M is described by a pair of parameters {d, Ry ： 
djt, money needed per unit of project j at time t, 
Rjt, returns per unit of project j received at time t. (2.2) 
11 . 
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Here all djt and Rjt are nonnegative. The return RjtS are stochastic vari-
ables and are supposed to be mutually independent with one another. If djt 
equals to zero, then Rjt must be zero, too. The expectation of Rjt is Vjt for 
any j and t. Without further specification in later chapters, we suppose that 
Rjt has a discrete distribution and for convenience , we assume that there are 
only two possible values for rjt： r^ and rjt with possibility q^ and q]^ . So we 
have: 
rjt = q%r% + q],T], (2.3) 
Assume Xj is the number of units invested in project j. Then in time t, 
Xj X djt amount of money is needed on project j in period t. Accordingly, the 
total return for project j is Rjt x Xj. 
When making investment decisions, investors not only consider returns, 
but also consider risks. In the basic model, we assume that there is no risk 
part in the utility functions. 
In the basic model, re-investment is allowed, which means that investors 
can use the returns generated previously to put into future needs. However, 
if the money requirement can not be met in some periods even with previous 
returns added, investors must borrow money with high rates. 
For example, the investors borrow money in period t for y dollars. The 
” interest rate is fT—力+.l)r. So in the end, investors need to pay y-\-y{T-t-\-l)r 
dollars for this financing action. We assume that r is large enough so that 
investors can not be too aggressive to borrow infinite amount of money because 
the cost for financing is larger than the potential returns for the same amount 
of investment. 
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2.2 The problem 
We have assumed the goal of investing actions is maximizing expected returns 
minus expected cost of borrowing. Suppose the portfolio is: 
X = (Xi,X2, ...,Xm~uXm) (2.4) 
Then the expected returns can be expressed as: 
m T — 
EE 工rnt (2.5) 
j=\ t=i . 
For the money borrowing part, we analyze from period 1. Suppose investors 
have formed a grand coalition and need to borrow money for at least y^  dollars 
in the first period, since there is no uncertainty before period 1. The only 
condition that must be met is: 
“ m n 
(2.6) 
j=i 
Here the left hand side is the money requirement of all projects in period 
1. The first part of the right hand side is the summation of budgets from all 
the investors in period 1. The second part is the money borrowed in period 1. 
So it is intuitively reasonable that the left hand side should be smaller than 
or equal to the right hand side. 
In period 2, we have possible realizations since there are m projects. 
We use k2 as the variable of realization. The value of k � c a n be from 1 to 2"". 
For each realization k)，rf^ is the realization vector of returns of all projects in 
period 2. Since the distribution of r^ s^ are discrete, the possibility of realization 
of /c2, which is pl^ can be calculated by using multiplying method. On the other 
« 
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hand, for each realization of k�,investors have a corresponding least borrowing 
amount yl^. So the returns from the portfolio can be expressed as: 
^ • (2.7) 
The money requirement conditions that must be met in period 2 are: 
m m n 
E 工J如 + E < + + + + 工.rl^yk2 (2.8) 
j = l j~l 7:=1 
The expected borrowing amount y^ in period 2 can be expressed as: 
2爪 
p I V I (2.9) 
fc2 = l 
” Similarly, in period 3, there are also 2爪 possible realizations. For each 
realization /cs with the possibility rl^ is the realization vector of returns 
of all projects. On the other hand, the borrowing amount in period 3 is not 
independent with previous realizations. We use ；i/^ 而 as the least borrowing 
amount if k) and ks are the realizations in period 2 and period 3 respectively. 
So the returns from the portfolio in period 3 can be expressed as: 
. 工.《 (2.10) 
The money requirement conditions that must be met in period 2 are: 
m n 
[Xj{dji + dj2 + dj3) < [ f e i + a,2 + a,3) + y^ 
j=l i=l 
+yl + vLks + z . (吃 + —jyh, h (2.11) 
The expected borrowing amount y^ in period 3 can be expressed as: 
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2爪 2爪 
？/3 二 E E p I P I V I m (2.12) 
k2=l k3=l 
Intuitively, in each period t, there are constraints. Fortunately, all 





= + ..., -\-ait) (2.14) 
ies 
So the problem for the basic model can be written in the following LP form: 
m T T 
V{S) -.Max E E 工广如 - E 2/(1 + (T -力 + 1)… 
•• j=i t=i t=i 
2'm 
s i yt = E 
/C2 = l A:3 = 1 kt — l 
m 




< 4 + + vl + vIM + ^ • + h 
m 
J=1 
+ ^ ‘ {r-i + r l + … + k,,..., kr (2.15) 
All the coefficients and variables in this problem are non-negative. 
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Prom the introduction, we have known that this LP problem is solvable. 
But does it always have non-empty core? The conclusion depends on the range 




Three sub-models and the 
allocation rule of Sub-Model III 
3.1 Three possible sub-models of the basic model 
Considering the possible ranges of portfolio x, we have three possible sub-
models generated from the generalized problem. 
3.1.1 Sub-model I 
Sub-model I only considers the portfolio x with Xj = 1 or Xj = 0 for any j. 
This model has direct applications. Some projects can only be invested once 
and can only be invested as a whole. For example, a country can only have one 
Post Service System because the investment amount is too big for a private 
party to afford. Moreover, most Post Service Systems never finance from small 
investors and other private parties because the government has to make sure 
the information concerning national security to be classified and to be touched 
only by the government. 
However, the problem is that even for the simplest case, Sub-model I is 
at least as hard as a knapsack problem, which is one of the Karp's 21 NP-
complete problems ([11]). For example, there is only 1 period, so the problem 
17 . 
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(2.15) turns to be: 
m 
V{S) : Max - 7 / 1 ( 1 + r) 
m 
s丄 Y^Xjd] + . 
Xj =0 or l , V j (3.1) 
Intuitively, this problem is at least as hard as a knapsack problem. More-
over, for this model, the core is possibly empty. For example, of all the in-
vestors, two investors are very rich and can purchase all the projects by their 
budgets alone. They will never have incentives to cooperate. On the contrary, 
they will compete to get the rights to invest on the projects. 
To summarize, the optimal solution of this model is hard to compute. On 
the other hand, the core can be empty. 
3.1.2 Sub-model II 
Sub-model II considers portfolio x with the range [0，Ip G W. Sub-model 
II applies for the situation that, for example, some projects need to bor-
row money from the society. The bonds are cut into many shares with each 
“ share so small that can .be viewed as infinitely small. These activities are 
called "Asset Securitization". The most famous example for Asset Securiti-
“ zation would be the "Mortgage Pass Through Certificate", started by Gov-
ernment National Mortgage Association of US in 1970s. On the website of 
http://www.securitization.net/, there are a lot information of securitization 
project information in Hong Kong as well as around the world. 
However, this model still can not fix the problem of empty core. Because 
rich investors still make grand coalition impossible, the core can be empty. 
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3.1.3 Sub-model III 
Sub-model III considers portfolio variables xs within range [0, +oop e IP. For 
example, some insurance companies, such as Prudential Co., have investment 
products that require investors to invest money in each month of the following 
years. The returns generated in previous periods can be re-invested in to 
the afterward periods. Investors can invest as much as they are capable of 
investing. 
This model can also be viewed as a special situation of Sub-model II: there 
are not only no rich investors, all the investors are small investors who can 
only buy a very small slice of the whole projects. It is never optimal to borrow 
a lot of money and buy the whole project for these investors because the 
interest cost is very high in comparison with the returns. In practise, small 
investors can buy the multi-period secularized bonds by cooperation and thus 
lower financing costs. Under this situation, the optimal solution solved by Sub-
model III is always the optimal solution of the corresponding special situations 
of Sub-model II. 
Similar with Sub-model I and II’ Sub-model III is a linear programming 
problem. The optimal solution can be solved by algorithms such as Simplex 
Method. Further more, as we will point out next, the core is never empty. 
3.2 The allocation rule of Sub-model III 
After setting the range of Xj and reviewing the general problem (2.15) in the 
last chapter, we can revise the primal problem (2.15) as follows: 
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m T T 
ViS) --MaxY^Y. ^J^Jt 一 E + ( r -《 + 
j = l t ~ l 
si ？/ = E E E PIAs-'PIVUm,...，k��t . 
/C2==l 3^ = 1 kt — l 
m 
E 工 - y ^ < as 
J=l 
Constraint Set 2 
Constraint Set 3 
Constraint Set {T - 1) 
Constraint Set T (3.2) 
Here each Constraint Set means a set of constraints, but not just one. For 
" instance, Constraint Set 2 has 2(2-1— constraints: 
m 
E ^jd^j - y ' - y l - x - r l < 4 , v/c2 (3.3) 
j=i 
Similarly, Constraint Set 3 has 2(3—1)""^  constraints: 
�� 
m E - — yl 一 yLh — ^ . K + 4 ’ 人’3 (3.4) 
j=i . 
The last Constraint Set T has the following constraints in it: 
m 
E ^jdJ — 2/1 — yl 一 vIm —…—"Lfc3’...’fc-r - ^. K + rL + … + ^ 
,Vk2,k3,...,kT (3.5) 
For Constraint Set t, there are 2(卜i— inequality constraints in it. 
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By taking the first equation = 2 � = 1 E ^ . i … I l l U p I p � 
into the objective function. We can easily tell that the problem has ( j + 1 + 2爪+ 
22m+ .2(:r--i)m) variables and (1 + 2爪 + 22爪 + ...2(了—”"^ ) constraints. Moreover, 
for each borrowing amount variable y, there is one and only one correspond-
ing constraint. The dual problem of (2.15) has (1 + 2"^  + + ...2(了—i—) 
variables 2 and each 2； a corresponding one for the borrowing amount variable 
y. Using another saying, if the borrowing amount variable y is ？/J；?’‘.••’。,，the 
corresponding dual variable 2 is z l * ’kt 
So the dual problem of (2.15) can be written as: 
T 
W{S) : MinY^a'sz' 
t=\ 
s.t.之t = ^ ^Umv-M ，V艺 
all k2,kzvM 
T 
E - E - E 心3 (^ Li + � � - … -
T 
E 《，A:3’...’fcT(rLj+rL. + … + r�r ’ j ) ^ H'^jtyj 
.. T 
t=2 
Constraint Set 2' 
Constraint Set 3' 
Constraint Set (T - 1)' 
Constraint Set T' (3.6) 
Similar with (3.3), Constraint Set 2' has 2(2—1— constraints: 
- _ ^ ^k2MM - … - �’A:3’...，fcr 
知3 k3,/c4’...’/cT 
>-Pk,(l + (T-l)r),Vk2 (3.7) 
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Constraint Set 3' has 2(3—1— constraints: 
—之 2 4 ’ f c 3 ， f c 4 — … — > + - 2)r), V/C2, /C3 (3.8) 
For Constraint Set there are 2(卜i— inequality constraints in it. So in 
constraint Set the constraints are: 
^ -Pk2,k3,...,kT(i + r),Vk2,...,kT (3.9) 
We can tell that the feasible region of the dual problem has no relationship 
with the coalition S. Moreover, both the primal problem and the dual problem 
are LP problems. The optimal values of V(S') and the corresponding 14/(5) 
are the same. These facts are saying that the only factors affecting the optimal 
. value of VF(5) are a^. What the impacts of these coefficients to V(S) are will 
be shown in the theorem below. 
. If the optimal solution of the dual problem of V{N) is got, we can get 
(之 1*’ 2；2*’ .•.’ by simple calculation. Then the core of the primal problem is 
not empty and ooe of the allocation rule is as follows: 
T 
u，. = (3.10) 
Here Ui means the return allocation to player i. 
• Theorem 3.1 For Sub model III of cooperative game (2.15), the grand 
coalition can always be achieved, namely the core is non-empty. One of 
the allocation rules that are in the core is as denoted in (3,10) 
Proof: 
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Firstly, we show that for any S CN, V{N) > V{S). 
Since the feasible region of the dual problem has no relationship with the 
coalition S, the difference of the feasible regions of the primal problem decide 
the value of In this problem, the number of variables are the same even 
for different S C N, namely the dimension does not change with S. 
I vl^ 
\ � 
f ^ . 
Figure 3.1: Two-dimension illustration, an arbitrary k'z 
As illustrated in the above figure, it is trivially to conclude that a]^  is larger 
than a!g for any S C N because grand coalition N has the most players and 
the most budget total. So the feasible region of problem V(N) is always larger 
than that of problem V"⑶，for any S C N. 
Since the objective of primal problem is to maximize, the larger feasible 
region leads to more choices and thus leads to a larger optimal value. So 
V(N) > V{S), for any SCN. 
Secondly, we show that the allocation rule (3.10) is in the core and satisfies 
« 
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the conditions of (1.1). 
For the first condition of (1.1): 
E … = E = = y{N) (3.11) 
ieN ieN t=l t=\ • 
The last equality in (3.11) is due to that for an LP problem with feasible 
solutions and a bounded optimal value, the duality gap is zero. On the other 
hand, the second condition of ( 1 . 1 ) ： 
= = 产 > = v{s) (3.12) 
ies ies t=i t=\ 
The inequality of (3.12) is due to that the objectives of dual problems 
are to minimize. We have that Er=i > V(S) if z^*) is not 
. the same with the optimal solution of the dual problem of V(S) and that 
EI=1 ds^ *^ = if ( ? * ， z ^ * ) is the same with the optimal solution of 
. the dual problem of V(S). So Yd&s社i can never be smaller than V{S) and we 
always have (3.12). The last equality is due to that for an LP problem with 
feasible solutions.and a bounded optimal value, the duality gap is zero. 
Since both the conditions have been met. We have proved that the alloca-
.� tion rule (3.10) is in the core. • 
Chapter 4 
A two period example of the 
revised basic model 
In the last chapter, we gave the basic model and proved the non-empty core. 
An algorithm for the dual problem of the revised two period example which 
has multiple possible return values is given in this chapter. 
4.1 The two period example with two projects 
In the previous chapters, we assume that every stochastic variable only has 
two possible values. Sometimes this assumption is not close to the reality. 
For example, there are only a few projects to invest but the returns of these 
projects depend on a highly complicated business environment and thus have 
many possible values. In this example, we assume that there are only two 
projects in the cooperative re-investment games and that at each period, each 
project has a stochastic return with m^ possible values, each with probability 
l/rrir. So project 1 has the following possible values in period 1: 
ni ’ i ,ni ,2 ,ni ’3 , (4.1) 
25 . 
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Moreover, the expected return of project 1 at period 1 can be expressed as 
follows: 
Hi = (rii,i + rn,2 + Hi,3 + … + r u , n j /叫 (4.2) 
Similarly, we can express the the possible values and the expected value of 
project 2. So the problem we address in this chapter can be written as follows: 
V^(S) : Max xi(ru + ru) + 2:2(7-21 + T22�— 
k=\ 
s.t. xid\ + X2dl — y^ < ag 
^idl + X2dl — — yl - xiru,k - X2r2i,k < 4 ’ V/c (4.3) 
Here k is the realization variable, which ranges from 1 to m^ because there 
- are ml possible realizations for the combination of two projects 1 and 2. ru,k 
denotes the return realization of project 1 at period 1 when the situation is k. 
T22,k denotes the return realization of project 2 at period 2 when the situation 
is k.The dual problem can be written as follows: 
�� 
.W'{S) : Mm a“i+4(f^Zfc2) 
“ - k=l 
m? 
S.t. + ^ < 1 + 2r 
fc=i 
+ E f^c - E :kn’fc > rii + ri2 
fc=l k=l 
TUr m^  
之 乂 4'r'2i,k > r2i + r22 
fc=l fc二1 
z l < { l + r ) / m l y k (4.4) 
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Since (4.4) is an LP problem, we suppose that {z^*, zf^^z^*,..., z'^ 2) is the 
optimal solution to the dual problem of V^(N). As we have known from 
previous chapters, the core of the basic model is non-empty. Does the same 
result apply for the example with multiple possible return values? 
• Theorem J^.l For the revised example of two period case for the basic 
model (4.3), the grand coalition can be achieved. Moreover, one of the 
allocation rules which are in the core is: 
= (4.5) 
k=l -
Here Ui means the allocated value to player i. 
Proof: 
The dimension of problems V'^ does not change with S, Using (Figure 3.2) 
again, we can tell that for the primal problem, the feasible region of V'^{N) is 
always the largest. Since the objective of the primal problem is to maximize, 
we have that > for any 5 C TV. 
Moreover, regarding the first condition of (1.1), allocation rule (4.5)satisfies 
that: 
ieN ieN A;=l 
k=i 
=V{N) (4.6) 
The last equality in (4.6) is due to that with feasible solutions and a 
bounded optimal value, the duality gap of an LP problem is zero. 
Chapter 4 ^ t/wo period example of the revised basic model 28 
For the second condition of (1.1), allocation rule (4.5)satisfies that: 
ies ies k=i 
> W{S) = V(S) (4.7) 
The inequality of (4.7) is due to that the objectives of dual problems are 
to minimize, which is similar with the proof of Theorem 3.1. 
Since both the conditions of (1.1) have been met. We have proved that the 
allocation rule (4.5) is in the core. • 
W ‘ 
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4.2 The algorithm for the dual problem 
As stated in the introduction part, many algorithms are responsible for solving 
LP problems such as (4.4). In this chapter, we develop an algorithm that has 
a better performance than on the worst case study. In order to make 
notations clear, we firstly sequence all the possible values of rn, ri2 in an 
increasing order, which means: 
ni ’ i < ni’2 < ni’3 < … S 
^21,1 < ^21,2 < ^21,3 < … S r2l,mr (4.8) 
So we can use two numbers i and j to replace the realization variable k. 
If under situation k, the realizations of rn and ri2 are ru i^ and r2ij respec-
tively, then the situation can be called ij. Then we use yfj and zfj to denote 
corresponding yl and zl. 





s-t. + + 
i—l j=l 
TTlr TTlr TUr TTlr 
z=l j=l i=\ j=l 
TUr TTlr VTIt TTlr 
+ > r21 + r22 
i=lj=l t=lj=l 
4 < ( l + r)/m2,Vz,j (4.9) 
As we have discussed in chapter 3, we can definitely find an optimal solution 
for problem (4.9). Next we present how the algorithm for solving (4.9) works. 
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Step 1: Start from solution 卻 = = 1 + 2r; zf^ = 0,Vi and j). Set 
ii, j i i2 and j � e q u a l to 1. 
Step 2: If zq is feasible, find a feasible solution Zi and the first active 
constraint by using Sub Algorithm F; if zq is infeasible, find a feasible solu-
tion Zi, find the first active constraint and update ii, j i , Z2, i � b y using Sub 
Algorithm II，. 
Step 3: Find the optimal solution z* by using Sub Algorithm III，. 
Step 4: Output 广 Stop. 
The algorithm for (4.9) does not have a definite search direction. Before 
each iteration, we have to firstly find which zf^  is the variable we are going to 
change or exchange value. Sub Algorithm I' can be expressed as follows: 
Step 1: Calculate Vi = (rn + ry^�Id\ and V2 = (r2i + r22)/d\. 
Step 2:If vi > V2, set = = = 0,Vz and j). If vi < V2, set 
zi = (z^ = V2； zfj = 0, Vz and j). 
Step 3: Output zi. Stop. 
Before introducing Sub Algorithm IF, we firstly define two functions: 
• rrir TTlr TTlr VTlr 
‘ = + of? E E 4 - E E ~ + n2) 
i=l j=l ?:=1 j=l 
92{z) = 92{Z\ZI) 
TTlr TTlr rUr TUr 
= 乂 减 + 名 E E 4 — E £ 4^21.； — (r2i + r22) (4.10) 
i=l j=l i=\ j=l 
So solution z is a feasible solution only if both 仍(2) > 0 and 奶(2；) > 0. 
Sub Algorithm 11，can be written as follows: 
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Step 1: Start from ii = 1, j i = 1 and 2^ = 1 and i) = 1. 
Step 2: Calculate v[ — [ — H u i . n —d\) and V2 = [—.92(之0)]+/(趕_ 
'^1232,32 —"》). 
If Zq — {I + r)/ml > 0, and if v[ > 2/2, update Zq = Zq — (1 + r) /mf and 
二（1 + r)/爪?，go to Step 3; else, update Zq = Zq - {1 r)/m'^ and 
4,i2j2 = (1 + r)/爪?，go to Step 4. 
If zl - (1 + r)/m^ < 0，and if v[ > v'^, update ：“)、= Zq and Zq = 0, go to 
Step 7; else, update 功’切。=and Zq = 0, go to Step 7. 
Step 3: If ffi(2o) < 0, go to Step 5; If 仍(句）> 0, update zl = Zq + (1 4-
r)lml - v[ and 2：“力 = g o to Step 7. 
Step 4: If "2(:o) < 0, go to Step 6; If 仍 � > 0, update = + (1 + 
r ) /ml - v'2 and zl^ j^^  = v'^ , go to Step 7. 
Step 5: If j i < TUr, j i = j i + 1, go to Step 2; If ji = m ” and if ii > <2， 
then ii = Zl + 1 and j i = j2 + 1, else, then = + 1 and j i = j2. go to Step 
2. 
Step 6: If 22 < rur, i飞—j2 + 1, go to Step 2; If ii — rrv, and if 力 > j i , 
then j2 =7.2 + 1 and Z2 = ii + 1, else, then j ) = j2 + 1 and i2 = ii- go to Step 
2. 
Step 7: Set Zi = zq. Output zi, 22,^ 2 Stop. 
From Step 3 and Step 4，we know that the feasible solution we get from 
Sub Algorithm II，must have gi{zi) = 0 or .92(21) = 0 or both .91(2:1) = 0 
and 没2(之1) = 0. Without loss of generality, we assume that 仍 二 0 and 
then continue to introduce Sub Algorithm III': 
Step 1: Input i i , j i , i2, j2 and zi. 
Step 2: If l(df — r“凡JA^i] < ( 4 / 4 , go to Step 5. If [(df — > 
4 / 4 . set z} = r"M’,:J[(l+r)/m3 — a n d 喊”』、=(l+r)/m，. 
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Go to Step 3. 
Step 3: If zl > 0，and if zi is feasible, go to Step 4; Else, zi is infeasible,set 
^hm = ^Ihh + 92(zi)/[{dl — — {dl —厂”力山)]and z； = 2； -
— — Go to Step 5 
Step 4: If j i < m” ji = ji + 1, go to Step 2; If ji = rUr, and if ii > 22, 
then Zl = ii + 1 and j i =^2 + 1, else, zi = zi + 1 and j i = 72+ 1- Go to Step 2. 
Step 5: Set = zi. Stop. 
Next we prove that our algorithm terminates at an optimal solution. 
Proof: 
Suppose that ；^ = is a solution generated from our algorithm but 
is not an optimal solution to (4.9). Moreover, without loss of generality, we 
_, assume that z'du + du ET=\ E7=i 4 " H S E^Ji 碌m’,: = m + 厂12’ namely 
that the first constraint is the active one. Then we consider two scenarios: 
•• Scenario I : ^^  = 0 
Scenario II : ^ 0 (4.11) 
\ \ 
Under Scenario I, in order to improve a “ i + a|(ESi E^Ji 4)，some z^'s 
value must be lowered. On the other hand, if some zfj's value is lowered, in 
order to maintain feasibility, other zf '^s value must be increased. But from 
Sub Algorithm IF, we know that the iteration sequence makes exchanging 
value between some zfj and others not able to improve the value of a “ i + 
^ ^ G S i jyji^i ^ij)-
Under Scenario II，we know that exchanging value between some zf^  and 
others is not going to improve + 4 ( ^ 1 � E ^ J i 4 ) , either. So the only 
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possible means is to exchange value between some zfj and z^. Suppose the 
iteration ends at ii, ji,^2, j2- Then we consider three sub-scenarios: 
Sub - Scenario I : = 1 + 2r 
Sub — Scenario II : z^ ^ I + 2r, ^^^^ = l/ml[l + r) 
Sub — Scenario III :：丄 7U + 2r, zl山 + l / m , ( l + r) (4.12) 
Under Sub-Scenario I, the only possible change is to decrease the value of ? . 
Suppose that we decrease z^ by a very small amount h. Since at least constraint 
1 must be feasible, we must increase the value of zf ^ by S(di2 — m . i M i ) to 
maintain feasibility. But from Sub-Algor i thm III’，we know that this change 
can not lead to the improvement of a^z^ + aKESTi 4 ) . 
Under Sub-Scenario II，suppose we decrease z^ by a very small amount 
S. Again, in order to maintain feasibility of constraint 1，we need to increase 
碌+1 or 之?2J2+i，s value. From Sub-Algor i thm III，again we know that this 
change can not lead to the improvement of a^z^ + E ^ i 功)，either. 
Or the iteration won't stop at 
suppose we increase z^ by a very small amount in order to at least 
improve agZ^ + aKE^Ti Hf^i zfj), we need to decrease zf^  j^ by 喊 l a \ to bal-
ance. From Sub-Algorithm III’，we know that this change will lead to that 
constraint 1 will be broken. 
Under Sub-Scenario III，for the same reason with that of Sub-Scenario I, 
decreasing z^  by a very small amount 8 and increasing《力 or zf^  j^  will not 
lead to the improvement of aJv^ ^ + E L i For the same reason with that 
of Sub-Scenario II, increasing z^ by a very small amount 6 and decreasing zf^ ^^  
will lead to that constraint 1 will be broken. 
By far we have found that no improvement could be done to agZ^ + 
TJjl^ i zfj). Contradiction! So 2 = is an optimal solution. 
) 
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Our algorithm terminates at an optimal solution.• 
The interior point algorithm has time complexity 0 (mj ) in the worst case of 
solving LP problems. But our algorithm stated above only has time complexity 
0 (mj ) in the worst case, which is more efficient for the worst case study. 
�� • 
Chapter 5 
Extensions of the Basic Model 
We have known that the Multi-period Cooperative Game problem with the 
Re-investment mechanism and with stochastic return variables has non-empty 
core. In previous chapters, we assumed that the returns are discrete distributed 
stochastic variables. However, for other coefficients, we can also assume them 
to be stochastic. Whether these models have non-empty core is definitely an 
interesting research topic. 
In practise, investors can not make 100 percent sure how much money 
they control in the future. The 2008 financial crisis made many corporations 
bankrupt, which made corresponding stock shares worthless. For example, 
the "Lehman Bothers" Mini-Bond affair still haunts many investors. So it's 
really difficult to say that the money investors control and available for future 
investment is deterministic. 
On the other hand, the commodity price change severely during these years. 
The crude oil price changed from nearly 140 dollar per barrel to less than 
40 dollar per barrel in only one year. Inflation also makes projects' money 
requirement not fixed. We may take the same example stated in Chapter 1, 
the Shatin New Town Plaza example. In 2000, Sun Hung Kai Group finished 
a reconstruction project for New Town Plaza Phase III, using 50 million HK 
dollars. In comparison with this project, a similar reconstruction work but 
35 
A 
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with longer duration from 2003 to 2008 cost Sun Hung Kai Group almost 1 
billion dollars. Although the projects are different, we can still feel the impacts 
to prices from inflation and other factors. 
So in a word, adding the stochastic budget and stochastic project price 
variables to the general model makes it more practical and have more appli-
cations. 
5.1 The model with stochastic budgets 
In this section, we firstly assume the return variables are deterministic. Later 
we consider the situation of stochastic return variables and stochastic project 
prices. 
In comparison with the general model of (2.15), the model with stochastic 
budget allows each player's available money au to be a discrete distributed 
“ stochastic variable An. Without loss of generality, we assume that there are 
only two possible values of Au with possibility 1 /2 for each player i at period 
t. So for a coalition S with n' players, there are 2"'(亡-1) possible value for A^g^ 
which denotes the stochastic budget variable for the coalition S. Although 
for different realizations, the summation of budget 5, namely the realization 
of As may be the same, it won't affect our findings to assume that they are 
w 
"different". Using similar realization variables /c2, ks,…,hp which indicate the 
realizations of Au in different periods, we have the following problem: 
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771 T T 
VsbiS) ： Max E 如 + iT-t + l)r) 
j=it=i t=i 
s-t yt = 1/2"'“-i)£ £ … • ’ V t 
fc2 = l /C3 = l = l 
m 
Constraint Set 2 
Constraint Set 3 
Constraint Set T (5.1) 
Here Constraint Set 2 consists of the following constraints: 
m 
T M < + + + (5.2) 
Constraint Set 3 consists of the following constraints: 
m 
< + + vl + + ^ • + V/C2, h (5.3) 
j=i 
While Constraint Set T consists of the following constraints: 
m 
^ 4’A:2’fc3’..A + + " I + + … + <，A:3’...’fcT 
j = l 
+ X • (r^ + r^ + ... + r^-^), V/C2, h , . . . , kr (5.4) 
We can find from the problem (5.1)that the more players coalition S have, 
the more constraints and variables y we have in the primal problem. So neither 
the feasible regions of the primal problems nor the feasible regions of the 
Chapter 5 Extensions of the Basic Model 38 
dual problems are the same for coalitions with different number of players, 
namely the dimensions are different. As illustrated in the example figure below, 
dimension differences make it impossible to directly compare V{S) and V{N) 




‘ Figure 5.1: Two-dimension illustration example, an arbitrary k � 
As we see, the only overlap part is the gray part. Does the cooperative 
game (5.1) have a non-empty core? 
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5.2 The core of the model with stochastic bud-
gets 
In this section, we prove that the model in the last section has a non-empty 
core. 
For the grand coalition N with n > n' players, the problem (5.1) changes 
to: 
m T T 
Vs,{N) -.Max EE工nt — E + (T —丨 + 1W -
j=it=i t=i 
s.t. yt = E £ …E ,.’。嫩 
fc"2 = l fc3 = l = l 
m 
户1 
Constraint Set 2 
Constraint Set 3 
Constraint Set f (5.5) 
Constraint Set 2 has the following constraints: 
m ~ 
T M < < * - 2 + " i + " l + r r i， \ / / c 2 (5.6) 
j=i 
Constraint Set 3 has the following constraints: 
t M < + ) , ‘ 厂 3 (5.7) 
In this settings, kt has 2" possible values for any t. Similarly, Constraint 
Set f is made of the followings: 
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m E 工� < � ’ “ � ’ + + + "Lc-3 + …+ "Lwr j=i 
+ . (ri + + … + r了-1)，V/c~2，^3’kr (5.8) 
The dual problem for grand coalition can be written as: 
T 
VK(yV) . Min^ 
t=l 
S.t. Z^ = y z[- r yt 
T E - T A / n — E + -…— 
� k2 k2M 
T 
…Z； _ 42’ifc-3’...，A:;>ji + rj2 + … + 斤—1) > 
T 
. t=2 
Dual Constraint Set 2 
Dual Constraint Set 3 
’� Dual Constraint Set f (5.9) 
Dual Constraint Set 2 consists of the following constraints: 
一〜"2 一 S — … — - T _ 
&3 k3,k4,...,kT 
> - 1 / 2 " . (1 + (T - l)r),V/c~2, /C3, / C 4 , k r (5.10) 
Dual Constraint Set 3 consists of the following constraints: 
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3 Y - _ V - -
~^k2,k3 一 ^k2MM — … k 2 M r - , k T 
fc: fc4,."’&T 
> -1/2^^ • (1 + (T - 2)r),V/c~2,fc3,/c~4,...,^T (5.11) 
Dual Constraint Set f consists of the following constraints: 
—zT-- - � - l / 2 ( … . ( l + r),V/c~2,...,/cT (5.12) 
Since both the primal problem and the dual problem is bounded and fea-
sible, the optimal solution always exists and can be solved by many algorithms. 
We suppose that one of the optimal solutions is {^n ^ ^nmM ' . . . ’ 仏 • … ’ 
then we have: 
• Theorem 5.1 For the models of Multi-period Cooperative Re-investment 
Games with stochastic budgets, such as (5.1), the grand coalition can be 
achieved. Moreover, one of the allocation rules which are in the core is: 
T 
Here Ui means the allocated value to player i. 
Here a , r r denotes the realization of Au when the realization variable � � 
is k2, h , . . . , kt. 
Proof: 
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We need to further prove that 
Y l u r > V s b i S ) y S c N (5.15) 
ies 
Choosing an arbitrary subset S C N with n' < n players, we can add S with 
another n-n' "imaginary players". These players also join the cooperative re-
investment game, but only with budgets 0 at any period. In other words, these 
imaginary players have the same stochastic budget variables at any period. The 
possible values are 0 and 0 with the same possibility 1/2. 
The problem (5.1) can be re-written as follows: 
m T T 
KbiN') '.Max ^j^jt + + 
j=i t=i t=i 
„ s.t. yt = E … E 4 � V 亡 
fc^=l ^=1 fc卜 1 
m 
‘ j=i 
Constraint Set 2' 
•• Constraint Set 3' 
• Constraint Set T' (5.16) 
Here Constraint Set 2' has the following constraints: 
m 
^ (5.17) 
Similarly, Constraint Set T' has the following constraints: 
m 
S ^ + V + y\ + y^K + … + yk�K”,.K 
+ + … + 厂厂1)’ V /4 k'T (5.18) 
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In (5.16), we use t4，fcws,...，fc丨 to denote the new budget variables. There are 
2令1) possible 
We can tell that in comparison with (5.5), problem (5.16) has the same 
dimensions of the feasible region. So now we can compare directly. (5.16) 
has a smaller bounded primal feasible region because the imaginary players 
contribute 0 to the budget variables for any t. 
Moreover, the dual problem of (5.16) can be written as: 
T 
t=i 
s.t. zt = Y^ 4� ’ . . . ’ f c”v , -
ju/ U Ic, 
- E - …-
t—\ 知2’&3 
T 
E : � � ’ . . . ’ 4 ( � i + … + > E^ji^J 
U U u 八 3 ”"jrv 了 
t=2 
• Dual Constraint Set 2' 
Dual Constraint Set 3' 
Dual Constraint Set T' (5.19) 
Dual Constraint Set 2' is as follows: 
-zl _ E —…一 H 之【冗”.兵 
fc ⑷ ’ … ， 
> - l / 2 " . ( l + (T- l ) r ) ,V /e^ (5.20) 
Dual Constraint Set 3' is as follows: 
> _ l / 2 2 n . ( i + (T-2)r),VA;^,/c^ (5.21) 
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Dual Constraint Set T' is as follows: 
’...’k'T > . (l + r)yk'2’ …,k'T (5.22) 
Now suppose one of the optimal solution to Wgfj(N) is 
(4* 
Actually this solution must also be an optimal solution of Wsb{N) because 
no imaginary player is needed to add to the grand coalition. 
The game with imaginary players is V乂N') and the dual problem is 
The new optimal solution will make V"二(TV') neither smaller nor larger than 
VsbiS) because the resource is the same. The imaginary players neither bring 
nor take away any money. equals to WsbiS), too. We use to rep-
resent the allocated returns to player i in the new game V^ /b � - T h e n we 
have: 
T 
ieN ieN ieN t=2 …’k'T 
‘ = K m 
�� =Wst iN) = \ U N ) (5.24) 
So again, the first condition of (1.1) is met. For the second condition of 
“ (Irl). We can see that the feasible region of (5.19) is totally the same with 
that of (5.9), which is unrelated to the subset S. So we have 
T 
Yl^'i = Yl'^'i = Yl + aN'i^N* 
ies ies ieN' t=2 it^,^,...,^ ‘ 
> Ktm = v:,(N') 
= ^ 6 ( 5 ' ) (5.25) 
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Here N' is the "imaginary grand coalition" with real players in subset S C 
N and some imaginary players, which are designed as (5.16). The inequality 
is due to that the feasible region of (5.16) is the smaller than that of (5.5) 
and that the dual problem (5.9) and (5.9) has the objectives of minimizing. 
In addition, as we have said, the last equality holds because imaginary players 
won't affect the optimal value of Since both the conditions of (1.1) 
are met, we have proved that the distribution rule (5.13) is in the core of the 
cooperative games (5.5). • 
Next we provide readers with an algorithm to calculated the core of a simple 
case. 
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5.3 An example: the two-period case of mod-
els with stochastic budgets and an algo-
rithm for the dual problem 
Theoretically the core of (5.1) is proved non-empty. The problem is an LP 
problem and can be solved by many existing algorithms. The famous interior 
point algorithm can solve LP problems with time complexity even 
in the worst case. In this section, we provide an algorithm solving the dual 
problem of the two period case in 0(771 )^ even in the worst case. 
In practise, many reinvestment real estate projects in Hong Kong do not 
have many periods. For example, the Lok Fu Plaza has two phases; the Argyle 
Center has two phases; the Shatin New Town Plaza has three phases. So our 
example address problems of (5.5) type with only two periods. 
- Suppose there are m projects and log? n players, then the problem is as 
follows: 
m T n 
K6’2 : Max E E 工 J � - + 2r) — 1/n 二 yl 
m 
�� s.t.Y^Xjd] .< a]v + "i 
. m m 
< + + (5.26) 
Here k is the realization variable. There are " 二 几 possible values for 
The dual problem of (5.26) is as follows: 
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n 
Wsb,2 : M m aljz^ + � k 4 
k=\ 
S.t. z'd] + ( 4 一 r , i ) j 2 4 > rji + 
z' + ± z l < l + 2r 
z 2 < l / n ( l + r),V/c (5.27) 
In the dual problem, there are m constraints presenting the variables of Xj 
in the primal problem. We divide these m constraints into two groups Jo and 
Ji, for any j G (1,2, ...,m) • 
j e Jo, if 4 ^ 考 — ” 1 
j e Ji, otherwise (5.28) 
Moreover, we assume that al < a�+i for any k. We can use this assumption 
because the time complexity of the fastest sequencing algorithm O(nlgn) is 
less than 0{n^) ([14]) and because sequencing is parallel with our proposed 
algorithm for solving the dual problem (5.27)，which is as follows: 
Step 1: Start from solution zo = (^：丄 二 1 + 2r; zl 二 0’V/c). 
Step 2: If zo is feasible, get a feasible solution and the active constraint 
number j i by Sub-Algorithm I. If zq is infeasible, get a feasible solution Zi 
and the active constraint number ji by Sub-Algorithm II. 
Step 3: Input and the active constraint number j , then get the optimal 
solution by Sub-Algorithm III. 
Step 4: Output and the other active constraint number if there is 
any. Stop. 
« 
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As we have previously found, the dual problem must have at least one fea-
sible solution. So a correct algorithm must find a z* finally. Sub-Algorithm 
I is as follows: 
Step 1: Calculate Vj = (r^i + rj2)/d] for all j e (1,2, ...,m). • 
Step 2: Find ji which satisfies that vj, > e (1,2, . . . ’m) / j i . 
Step 3: Set = = Vj,]zl = Oyk). 
Step 4: Output zi, ji and k' = 1. Stop. 
While Sub-Algorithm II is as follows: 
Step 1: Calculate Vj = (rji +r,2 - {l + 2r)d])/{d:j-r^i-d]) for all j e Ji. 
Step 2: Find j i € J! which satisfies that Vj, > V j ^ j G J i / j i . 
Step 3: Calculate k' = [nvjj{\-^r)\ and i;力-/c'(l+r)/n. Set = = 
1 + 2r _ = 0,Vk> k'-= r)/n’V/c < k'; zl = Vj, 一 + r)/n). 
Step 4: Output Zl, ji and k'. Stop. 
From Sub-Algorithm I and Sub-Algorithm II’ we can tell that Zi must 
be a feasible solution and the left hand side of the ji constraint equals to the 
right hand side of the j ! constraint. This is the reason why we call j i the 
active constraint number. 
Sub-Algorithm III is expressed as follows: 
Step 1: Input Zl, ji and k'. Calculate a�fc//a)v. 
Step 2: If > ( ( f � — g o to Step 4. If < (cP]— 
rvi)Aij’set (2i)i =(之1)1 一 = (l+r)/n 
and then go to Step 3. 
Step 3: If Zl is infeasible, find and ja by using the Sub-Sub-Algorithm. 
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Go to Step 5. If is feasible, k' = k' + I and go to Step 2. 
Step 4: Set = 2；!. Go to Step 5. 
Step 5: Output z* and j2’ if there is any. Stop. 
In Sub-Algorithm III, {zi)i denotes the first term of solution zi. {zi)i+k' 
denotes the (1 + /c'产 term of solution 21. So in the step 2 of Sub-Algorithm 
III, at most two terms in the feasible solution zi are changed. The Sub-Sub-
Algorithm is as follows: 
Step 1: If (zi)i < 0, set (A)fc' 二（1 + r)/n + - r^i) and (21)1 = 0. 
Go to Step 4. If (21)1 > 0 Calculate u] 二（rji + rj.2 — (zi)id'j - - r , i ) ( l + 
r)/n)/((dl - r v ) 4 / � — ( d ] - r,i)) for all j G (1,2’ ...,m). Go to Step 2. 
Step 2: Find J2 which satisfies that Uj^  > u j ^ j G (1,2, ...’m). 
Step 3: Set that (zi)i+k> = {zi)i+k'-Uj^ and that (^i)i = (2:1)1+^^2(4 一 
Step 4: Output and j2, if there is any. Stop. 
By far, we have shown how the algorithm works. We can tell that even 
for the worst case, the time complexity of our algorithm is faster than + 
nlgn), which can be viewed as 0(n2). Next we prove that the above algorithm 
terminates at an optimal solution. -
Proof: 
Suppose that z = {z\zl) is a solution generated from our algorithm but is 
not an optimal solution to (5.27). We consider two scenarios: 
Scenario I : = 0 
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Scenario II : ^ 0 (5.29) 
Under Scenario I, we suppose that z^ is larger than zero and 心 i equals 
to zero. From Sub-Algorithm I and Sub-Algorithm II’ we know that 
there is at least one active constraint. Since z^  = 0，it is impossible to make 
aJv i^ + E L i larger while maintaining the feasibility. So z is one of the 
optimal solutions. 
Under Scenario II, again we suppose that z^ ^ is larger than zero and 心丄 
equals to zero. For the same reason with that of Scenario I,- it is impossible 
to make ajv? + E L i � l A larger while maintaining the feasibility just by 
changing the values of ；^^. The only possible method to improve the optimal 
value is to change and together. We consider three sub-scenarios: 
Sub — Scenario I : z^ = 1 -\-2r 
Sub - Scenario II : ：！ — 1 + 2r, z^ = l / n ( l + r) 
. Sub — Scenario III : z^ ^ + l / n ( l + r ) (5.30) 
Under Sub-Scenario I，the only possible change is to decrease the value of 
Suppose we decrease z^  by a very small amount b. Since there must be at 
least one active constraint j , we must increase the value of z\ by -r^ji/c/)) 
to maintain feasibility. But from Sub-Algorithm III, we know that we must 
have ( a ‘ , / a ] v ) > {d]-Tjx)ld], so this change can not lead to the improvement 
“ of'aJv? + E L i 如 [ 
Under Sub-Scenario II’ suppose we decrease z^  by a very small amount b. 
Again, in order to maintain feasibility of constraint j , we need to increase zl 
by — rji/d]). However, from Sub-Sub-Algorithm, we know that after 
this change, another constraint's feasibility will be broken. So we can only 
increase z^. 
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suppose we increase by a very small amount (5, in order to at least 
improve + 观 need to decrease zl^ by 5a\Ja] ’^ko- From 
Sub-Algorithm III, we know that this change will lead to that constraint j 
will be broken. 
Under Sub-Scenario III, for the same reason with that of Sub-Scenario I, 
decreasing z^  by a very small amount 6 and increasing 
will not lead to the improvement of + E L i For the same reason 
with that of Sub-Scenario II, increasing ？ by a very small amount (5 and 
decreasing z|�by will lead to that constraint j will be broken. 
By far we have found that no improvement could be done to a j^Z^ + 
Contradiction! So z •二 {z\zl) is an optimal solution. Our 
algorithm terminates at an optimal solution.• 
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5.4 An interesting marginal effect 
We have shown an algorithm by which we can solve the dual problem (5.27)and 
find an allocation rule that helps investors cooperate. However, how much 
marginal reward will each investor gain if the value of an a ‘ changes? 
As we know, if one increases, all players will at least get the amount 
before the increasing of a%�f^ . But we don't know which player will gain more 
and which player won't. It may happen that although a player could have 
a better possibility to have more budget, nobody will gain more after the 
allocation. 
Prom the algorithm in the last section, we know that (d'j - rji/d]) is a key 
value. In each iteration of Sub-Algorithm II and Sub-Algorithm III, we 
use this value to compare with o?n�Jo}n. What makes our analysis easier is 
that [d] — Tji/d]) is a fixed value because only are stochastic. 
- From the Sub-Algorithm III, we find that if the algorithm terminates at 
k), namely that z l = 0 for all ki > ko, then the single small increase of 
‘ for all ki > ko won't change the optimal solution and thus will not change the 
optimal value of 1/56,2 because the objective of the dual problem is as written 
in (5.27). We know that is the summation of budgets from all investors. 
So if the change of one possible value of A t^, au�k can only lead to the change 
�� of alj j^^ with ki > ko, then this possible value a仗it has zero marginal effect. 
In other words, increasing a,t’k by a small amount or decreasing au’k a small 
•‘ value won't change the optimal solution and thus brings every investor no 
extra reward. 
Moreover, another situation may happen. The marginal reward could pos-
sibly only go to the player who contribute more to the total budget. 
If a small amount was increased only to a ^ � w i t h ki < /cq, the optimal 
solution won't change, either. But from the objective of the dual problem 
(5.27), we can tell that the optimal value will increase. However, since ？ has 
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no change, players who do not contribute to the increase of a%j^�get no extra 
reward. The marginal reward only goes to the players who contribute to the 
total budget . 
By far we know that if has a small change, then: 
if ki > ko.no marginal reward 
if ki < ko^all marginal reward to contributors (5.31) 
What happens if h = ko'l Since from the algorithm, we know that a l^Ja ] , 
must be at least no smaller than two Sub-scenarios are considered: 
Sub 一 Scenario I ： a%�Ja\ • (d] - Vji/d]) 
Sub - Scenario II ： a^Ja], 二（c^�—r 滴 (5.32) 
Under Sub-Scenario I, we can find that the situation is the same with 
/ci < ko. Reward will only go the players who contribute to the marginal 
change of ajj^ i,^ . 
Under Sub-Scenario II, the situation is quite complicated. The total al-
gorithm may terminate at a different ko. Then marginal analysis can not be 
conducted because the situation is not "marginal" any more, a big change has 
already happened due to the marginal change. We leave this topic for future 
research. 
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5.5 A Model with stochastic project prices, 
stochastic returns and stochastic budgets 
As stated in the beginning of this chapter, project prices, investors' budgets 
and project returns all can be stochastic instead of deterministic. So next, 
we consider the model with stochastic project prices, stochastic returns and 
stochastic budgets. 
Without loss of generality, we assume that all the stochastic variables only 
have two possible values. For example, the project price Djt can only be 
djtfi and Suppose there are n investors and m projects, the number 
of possible combinations for project prices at period t is 2""; the number of 
possible combinations for returns at period t is 2"^ ; the number of possible 
combinations for budgets at period t is 2". We use I“ kt and ht to denote 
the realization variable of stochastic budgets, stochastic returns and stochastic 
project prices. We use multiplying to calculate the total possible combinations 
at each period t. So there are 2(卜爪+爪+") combinations at period t. We 
can find that whether rjr is stochastic or deterministic will not affect the 
investment decision. We just assume that r^r is deterministic for all j. 
So the problem of the model with stochastic project prices, stochastic re-
turns and stochastic budgets can be written as follows: 
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TTl T T 
V^aiS) : M a 工 f ： E + + 
j=i t=i t=i 
s.t. yt = (i/2(卜 i)(糾 力 E yL..M2’...MM”.‘M,"^t 
h2�…,ht �…M ,…�l^t 
m 
j=i 
Constraint Set 2 
Constraint Set 3 
Constraint Set T (5-33) 
Constraint Set 2 has the following constraints: 
771 
< + (5.34) 
For Constraint Set 3: 
m 3 2 \ 
^ 4/2,/3 + y + yLhM + yh2MhhMM + ^.(厂^+厂&3) 
j=i 
’ V / l 2 ， " 3 " 2 " 3 ’ “ （5.35) 
And Constraint Set T: 
- + yl’hM + yh2MhhMM + ••• 
J=1 
+?/L...，"r’/2’".,/'r’fc2’..>r + ^ . + "I + … + " ^ 力 
’ V/i2, h3,..., hT, k, •••, h , kt, . . . ， k r (5.36) 
Again, we try to find the dual problem of (5.33). The dual problem Wsa{S) 
can be written as: 
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T 
: M m E 4’/2’...’“4’...’/u’/2’...’“’,2’...，AJ + 
h2,..’’ht’h’...�lt,M,...’kt 
T 
t=l h2,...,ht h2,hM 
4,/l3,/‘2,/3，/C2,fc3(^ ，fc2 + r�,k3) 一…一 
v ^ T , 1 2 T — 1 、 
乙 Z/l2’...’"T’/2’...’/r，fc2’...，fcr(�’fc2 +� ’ /C3 + … + Tj kT ) 
T-\ 
> L o t 
t=l 
T 
一 ? — P 之k、…Mh”.JtM”..�kt 2—1.(1 + Tr) 
Dual Constraint Set 2 
Dual Constraint Set 3 
Dual Constraint Set T (5.37) 
Dual Constraint Set 2 consists of the following constraints: 
— 〜 仏 2 — -…一 Zl ^h2,...,hTh,...,lT,k2,...,kT 
> + (5.38) 
Dual Constraint Set 3 consists of the following constraints: 
_ 3 _ 4 
h4,l4,k4 
— E � ’ . 
lM�.'”hT�l4r,”lT�l^4�"”f^T 
2 —(1 + CT - 2)r)/22(2-+乂 V/i2，/13, /2, k , h � h (5.39) 
Last but not least, Dual Constraint Set T consists of the following con-
straints: 
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_Zh2,...,hT�h，‘",h,k2,‘”,kT — 一 l ) ( 2 m + n ) 
，V/i2’..., hr^h, •••’ h , h,…，kr (5.40) 
• Theorem 5.2 The core of Problem (5.33) is not empty. 
We omit the proof here because in the next chapter, a more generalized 
case, which involves risks will be introduced and the allocation rule that is in 
the core will be shown and proven. Since (5.33) is only a special case of the 





Model with risks 
In previous chapters, we don't need to consider investors' feelings on the un-
certainty in the utility functions. However, investors may love to face more 
risks or less risks. In this chapter, We show that the extension models with 
- risks of li risk measure and loo measure have non-empty cores. 
6.1 The Model with li risk measure 
In this chapter, ..we assume that the investors have agreed on a positive risk 
price A. This risk price indicates how much risks investors is willing to avoid 
'� if there is 1 dollar uncertainty. Moreover, we assume that investors are risk-
a,verse. So without further specification, A is always positive. 
•  Regarding the risk price A, this coefficient is not easily decided by the 
investors alone. Normally from the market data, including stock price data 
and option price data, we can plot a risk-return "efficient frontier", each point 
on the efficient frontier a corresponding point of a risk price A. According to 
their own preference, investors can make decisions regarding A by the risk-
return "efficient frontier". 
58 
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After deciding the A, with 1 unit project j invested, the risk investors face 
is as follows: 
Qj = EE\Rj t - r j t\ (6.1) 
t=i 
The reason why we can simply add up the risk of each period is the time 
independence of each Rjt- So if the portfolio is {xi,x2, ..-.xt), for h risk 




Again, the project independence of each R]t enables to add all terms di-
rectly in (6.2). By taking the risk price A into consideration and using the same 
notations in Section 5.4, the objective function of the multi-period cooperative 
re-investment games model with li risk and the constraints can be expressed 
as follows: 
m T T 
Vi(S) : Max ^ ^ Xjrjt - ；^ + (T - t + l)r) — Au 
j=i t=i t=i 
m 
s.t. ^ > y^ XjQj 
•7=1 
yt = ( i / 2 “ — ” — + - + " ) ) E ？ 4 ’ . 
h2、“,,h“l2,".,lt’k2”“Jct 
m 
Constraint Set 2 
Constraint Set 3 
Constraint Set T (6.3) 
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Again, Constraint Set 2 has the following constraints: 
m 
E ^ j d j M < 4 ’ /2+"i+?4/2 ’h+z.rLV"2，/2，A:2 (6.4) 
j=i 
For Constraint Set 3: 
m 
^ 4 / 2 , / 3 + + v L h M + v L h M . M M + ^ . ( 吃 + O 
•7 = 1 
，V"2’"3"2’/3’/i^2’ 知 (6.5) 
And Constraint Set T: 
m 
工jdlh2M,...,hT ^ + + viihM + yh2,h3,l2,l3,k2M + ••• 
J=1 
I T . 2 3 rj~i 
-^yh2M,...,hT,l2,:.,lT,k2,:;kT + 工• + f^cs + … + ^fcr) 
,Wi2, hs,...’ h/r, h,...’ IT, &2，^r (6.6) 
. Again, we try to find the dual problem of (6.3). The dual problem Wi{S) 
can be written as: 
T 





E t 广 1 2 T—1� 
2/l2”..’/l7^ /2”..’/T’fc2”..’A::r(r_)’fc2 + 厂j’fc3 + … + ) 
h"2’".’hT’h’".�h�k2’...,lcT 
T-l 
t = l 
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T 
- ? “ Yl Yl ?h2,...,ht,i2,...,it,k2,...M 2 - 1 . (1 + Tr) 
h2’...’ht’h’...’lt’k2”.,’kt 
Dual Constraint Set 2 
Dual Constraint Set 3 
Dual Constraint Set T (6.7) 
Dual Constraint Set 2 consists of the following constraints: 
2 3 
hshM 
— Y^ ,^T 
/ /l2,...’/lT’Z2’..-’'T’&2’...’b 
/i3，".Ar’'3’...’"r，h’...,&T 
> - - ( l + ( T - l)r)/2(2-+乂Wi2，/2，/C2 (6.8) 
Dual Constraint Set 3 consists of the following constraints: 
h2MhhMM 乙 � , h s ,h“2 h,“ M M M … 
/l4，/4，A:4 
Zh2”..�hT�h”..�lTM�."�kT 
/i4，…,hx ’“，•. Mr，’ …yl^ T 
> - - ( l + ( T - 2)r)/22(2-+"), V/i2，"3，k, /3, /C3 (6.9) 
Last but not least, Dual Constraint Set T consists of the following con-
straints: 
,V/i2,…’ liT, hi …’ It,知，…，kr (6.10) 
Again, we found that both the primal problem (6.3) and the dual problem 
(6.7) are LP problems, bounded and feasible. So there must be an optimal 
solution to the dual problem (6.7), which is supposed to be: 
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^ = ( 之 1 ’之1/2’知2’之二’/13,/2’/3’^：2’^：3’，"’之【二.，/1了,'2,...’/7’’知2’..）了) (6-11) 
Then we have the following theorem: 
• Theorem 6.1 For the models with li risk measure (6.3)，the grand coali-
tion can be achieved. Moreover, one of the allocation rules which are in 
the core is: 
T 
•a, = ajzi* + X： E <h”..’it<’...M2’...’itM’...，ktyt (6.12) 
t=2 h<2”..’ht’hr..,k’k2’.",kt 
Here Ui means the allocated value to player i. 
Proof: 
For the first condition of (1.1), we find that 
f 
T 
i 印 ieN t=2h2,...,hth,-M,k2r-M 
T 
t=2 h^2,...’ht’h�..‘’lt’k2�...�kt 
=W,{N) = V,{N) (6.13) 
So we need to further prove that (6.34) satisfies the second condition of 
( i . i ) . . 
Similar with (5.5), different subset S C N leads to different dimensions. 
But we know that the dimensions of prices and returns do not change with the 
number of players subset S C N have. So we can use the "imaginary players" 
technique again. Suppose a subset S has n' players, we add n-n' "imaginary 
players，’ with zero money into 5, then the problem Vi{S) can be re-written as 
Vi{N'), which is: 
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m T T 
Vi(N') ： - + (了 —力 +1斤)-A以 
j=lt=l t=l 
m 
s-t. U > Y^^jQj 
yt 二（i /2“-i)(-+-+")) E ？4...，"w“’...斗’‘..’吟’ V力 
h岁 uf ]f If y y /1'2) • • •)»)i'2 J • • • jvij^  >2 >' *''�T 
m 
3 = 1 
Constraint Set 2' 
Constraint Set 3' ~ 
Constraint Set T' (6.14) 
Again, Constraint Set 2' has the following constraints: 
m 
< + + + ^ • v/1'2,12, K (6.15) 
‘ 产 1 
For Constraint Set 3': 
m 
’ � ’ ( 6 . 1 6 ) 
And Constraint Set T': 
m 
Ed丁 丁 1 2 3 ^^  
•7 = 1 
’ ’.. • ，,2 ’... 了’&2, • ‘., &了 I ( 1 &3 t I /c 了） 
, ， … ， " T , 5..., It, , • •., ^ T (6.17) 
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The dual problem of (6.14) M^i(iV') can be written as: 
T 
H^iV') : MinY^ E + 之'1 
t二2 h/ h' V V y k' 
s.t. V < X 
T 
t=l h'2’…’h't h'2’l'2’k!^ 
' , g ' , + rlk'J 一 … — 
y\ z'^ h' V I' k' fc'+ … 
hf h' V “ y y 
T - l 
> E 厂 + 
t=l 
T 
� � • • : ” . _ ’ � ’ … — 1 (1 T^T'^ 
i—2 h! V I, V y k' 
Dual Constraint Set 2' 
Dual Constraint Set 3' 
Dual Constraint Set T' (6.18) 
Dual Constraint Set 2' consists of the following constraints: 
�� 
_ '2 _ V^ J2> 
— 乙 — . . . 
h' I' y 
/ j h' “ ” y i-' 
^^  ‘ •'Q > ‘ ••�• Vrp�lty，• •• ylrj^，ft �• • • j rV<-T-( 
h' h' 1' I' y y 
> —(1 + C^ — V ) 華 命 、 乂 l � � k � (6.19) 
Dual Constraint Set 3' consists of the following constraints: 
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- 之 ！ ？ ⑷ ， / � ’ f c ⑷ - 化 ， W � / c � f c � - … -
, , , E , ‘ ‘ ‘ 秦 ’ 4 H I . ( T - 書 ( 一 ） 
(6.20) 
Last but not least, Dual Constraint Set T consists of the following con-
straints: 
— Zli u I' I' k' k' 一（丄十 
’ V/l'2，..., h’T, …’ I'T, …，k'T (6.21) 
Since (6.18) and (6.7) have the same dimensions, we suppose the optimal 
solution to (6.18) is 
Then we have: 
T 
ieS i£N' t=2 h2,...,ht,l2’...，kM’."’kt 
T 
=Wi{N') = Vi{N') = ViiS) (6.23) 
The inequality is due to that the objective of (6.18) is to minimize and that 
the size difference of feasible regions of the primal problems. Since both the 
conditions of (1.1) are met. (6.34) is in the core. • 
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6.2 The Model with I^q risk measure 
We continue to use A as the risk price agreed by investors from market data. 
The risk that investors face, however, is different and can be written as follows 
if the portfolio is (xi, 0:2,..., Xt)' 
msLXXjQj (6.24) 
By taking the risk price A into consideration, the objective function of the 
multi-period re-investment model with /qq risks and the constraints can be 
expressed as follows: 
m T T 
Voo{S) '.MaxY^Y. ^nt - E + - ^ + 1)0 -
3=1t=l t=l 
s.t. U > X j Q j y j 
yt = ( 1 / 2 ( 6 l ) (m+m+n)) ^ ?/L...’ht“2,...,Zt’fc2’...’fct，V� 
m 
Constraint Set 2 
Constraint Set 3 
.. ^ • Constraint Set T (6.25) 
Constraint Set 2 has the following constraints: 
m 
< 4 ’ ,2+" i+"L2 ’ f c2+T.rL,V"2"2，/c2 (6.26) 
j=l 
For Constraint Set 3: 
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m 
Y^ 工j4’"2’"3 - ^S,l2,l3 + + liLhM + VLMM^MM + ^ . + 
•7 = 1 
,\fh2,h3,l2,l3,k2,k3 (6.27) 
And Constraint Set T: 
m 
\^ jT 1 2 3 
l^Tj�MM,…’h'r - + " + Vh^hM + yh2MhhMM + … 
•7 = 1 
+ y f i 2 , h 3 A t , h + ^ . + + … + 厂二) 
,V/i2, /i3,…，hT, h,..., h , &2，…，kr (6.28) 
Again, we try to find the dual problem of (6.3). The dual problem Woo{S) 
can be written as: 
T 
^oc(s) ： MinJ2[ Y. 4’Z2’...’"42’...’/W2’...’"’fc2’...’ij + 
h2,...’kt’h’.‘.’“’h2’.‘.M 
m 
S.t. y^ Vj < X 
j=i 
• T 
qj 巧 + dj�IV2’“”ht�2,-"，htj2’‘‘-,lt,k2,.",kt — 
亡 = 1 h2”..，ht h2,l2,k2 
IZ �...,/iT’Z2”..，Zr’fc2”..’fcT(rifc2 + r�’fc3 + … + ^Ikr) 
T - 1 
t=l 
T 
一之 1 一 SI Y^ 2 • (1 + Tr) 
h^2’.‘.’ht,l2,”',U,k2’.“,kt 
Dual Constraint Set 2 
Dual Constraint Set 3 
Dual Constraint Set T (6.29) 
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Dual Constraint Set 2 consists of the following constraints: 
— 之 ! i 2 � h M - ^ ^h2MhhMM - … 
hz.hM E T 
> - ( l + Cr-l)r)/2(2-+n)’V"2’Z2,/c2 (6.30) 
Dual Constraint Set 3 consists of the following constraints: 
_ Y ^ 4 — — 
h2MhhMM 乙 h2M M h M M M M —…— 
/14’Z4,/C4 
E 式…A•…’ItM’…> —(1 + (了- 2)r)/22(2-+") 
,V/l2,/i3,/2,/3,A;2,/C3 (6.31) 
Last but not least, Dual Constraint Set T consists of the following con-
- straints: 
-"^ /i2’...’/ir’/2’...，/'/’’fc2’...’A:r — )( 斗） 
,V/i2,…’ hr, k, . .yh , h � . . . , kr (6.32) 
Suppose the optimal solution to (6.29) is 
么 = = ( 之 ‘ • • • ' ’...’fcr) (6.33) 
Then we have the following theorem: 
• Theorem 6.2 For the models with I � risk measure (6.25), the grand 
coalition can be achieved. Moreover, one of the allocation rules which 
are in the core is: 
Ui = alz^* + 
T 
S …’ IA*2’…M2’…’ It,k2,...’kt,別(6.34) 
h2’.,.�ht�l2,,.,,h’k2”.,�kt 
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Here u, means the allocated value to player i. 4:...M’."’it’h’.",kt is as 
noted in (6.33). 
We omit the proof of Theorem 6.2 here because the proof is quite similar 
with that of Theorem 6.1. 
Risk measures with positive A will lead to less utilities if other coefficients 
stay unchanged. The first reason is that from (6.3) and (6.25) we can see 
that more constraints are added to the original models. Since the objective 
is to maximize, the optimal value will decrease. On the other hand, stronger 
feelings against risk will intuitively make investors less aggressive, which makes 
total expected returns drop. 
Chapter 7 
Numerical Tests 
In previous chapters, we find two algorithms to calculate the allocation rules 
of the two-period cases. Prom these algorithms, we can find some rules about 
how a marginal change may affect the cooperation of investors. However, for 
the cases with three or more periods, we can not find an algorithm with good 
performance on time complexity. So in this chapter, we try to use MATLAB 
“ programming to find some heuristic rules about how the coefficient change 
affect investors allocation. What interest us is the marginal effect, namely 
how coefficients change affect the allocation amount to each player. 
We use 3 periods as the our experiment target because in comparison with 
2 periods, 3 period case can show the model characteristics more thoroughly 
and does not make numerical tests not clear. Moreover, we set two groups of 
investors, the rich one and the poor one. The main goal of numerical tests is to 
compare the difference between allocations changes to two difference groups. 
TKe experimental data used in this chapter are simulated data. Readers please 
refer to the appendix. 
In the following sections, We use "Difference" to denote the amount changes 
of two neighbor experimental results, namely the allocation changes resulting 
from coefficient changes of experimental data. We use "Percent" to denote the 
relative changes of two neighbor experimental results. 
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7.1 The affects from uncertainty changes 
From the Table 7.1, we can find that along with the increase of uncertainty, all 
investors allocate more. So it can be said that the bigger the uncertainties are, 
the more returns each investor gets. More importantly, we find that investors 
in the rich group get more than the ones from the poor group. But the relative 
growth is pretty much the same. So we can conclude that the affects from 
uncertainty changes are relative affects, namely each investor gets 
a similar growth or decline rate from the return increase made by 
uncertainty changes. 
7.2 The affects from budget changes 
Using Table 7.2, we can find that if all the budgets of all investors increase by 
the same amount, the returns going to each investor increase. What's more? 
The affects from budget changes are not relative affects, but amount 
affects. These affects do not change with group changes. As long as a person 
has 1 dollar more for investment, no matter he is a poor investor or a rich 
investor, he gets the same amount of rewards. 
7.3 The affects from the budget changes of 
only one group 
If only the rich group gets more budget or only the poor group gets more 
budget for investments, how will these changes affect all the investors? We 
can see from the Table 7.3 and Table 7.4 that the extra returns only go 
to the contributors. This finding is in accordance with one of the finds in 
Chapter 5 for 2 period cases. The data in our numerical tests have shown that 
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Table 7.1: Uncertainty affects (Partial data) 
Differencel Difference? Differences Difference4 
0.000264746 0.000710002 0.002864076 0.001961528 
0.000265682 {).()()071251 0.002874194 0.00196846 
0.000266622 0.000715032 0.002884365 0.001975428 
0.000267567 0.000717567 0.002894591 0.001982431 
0.000268519 0.000720116 0.00290487 0.001989483 
0.000269472 0.000722677 0.002915207 0.001996544 
0.000270433 0.000725253 0.002925596 0.002003663 
0.000271399 0.000727842 0.002936042 0.002010818 
0.00027237 0.000730446 0.002946544 0.002018012 
0.000273346 0.000733063 0.002957102 0.002025245 
‘ 0.000274328 0.QQQ735695 0.002967714 0.002032523 
Percent 1 Percent2 Percent3 Percent4 
- 1.47081E-05 2.62964E-05 2.25518E-05 1.03238E-05 
1.47601E-05 2.63893E-05 2.26314E-05 1.03603E-05 
1.48123E-05 2.64827E-05 2.27115E-05 1.0397E-05 
1.48648E-05 2.65765E-05 2.27921E-05 1.04338E-05 
“ 1.49177E-05 . 2.6671E-05 2.2873E-05 1.0471E-05 
1.49707E-05 2.67658E-05 2.29544E-05 1.05081E-05 
‘ 1.50241E-05 2.68612E-05 2.30362E-05 1.05456E-05 
1.50777E-05 2.69571E-()5 2.31184E-()5 1.05833E-()5 
1.51317E-05 2.70536E-05 2.3201 lE-05 1.06211E-05 
1.51859E-05 2.71505E-05 2.32843E-05 1.06592E-05 
1.524()4E-05 2.7248E-05 2.33678E-05 1.06975E-05 
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Table 7.2: Budget affectsl, all increase (Partial data) 
DifFerencel Difference2 Differences Difference4 
0.445670225 0.445670225 0.445670225 0.445670225 
0.445627365 0.445627367 0.445627387 0.445627263 
0.445584384 0.445584384 0.445584386 0.445584375 
0.445541249 0.445541249 0.445541249 0.445541249 
0.44549797 0.44549797 0.44549797 0.44549797 
0.445454545 0.445454545 0.445454545 0.445454545 “ 
0.445410975 0.445410975 ‘ 0.445410975 0.445410975 
0.445367259 0.445367259 0.445367259 0.445367259 
0.445323395 0.445323395 0.445323395 0.445323396 
0.445279395 0.445279394 0.445279375 0.445279498 
0.445235223 0.445235223 0.445235223 0.445235223 
0.445190913 0.445190913 0.445190914 0.445190913 
• 0.445146454 0.445146454 0.445146454 0.445146454 
0.445101843 0.445101843 0.445101843 0.445101843 
0.44505708 0.44505708 0.44505708 0.44505708 
0.445012165 0.445012165 0.445012165 0.445012165 
0.444967097 0.444967097 0.444967097 0.444967097 
0.444921875 0.444921875 0.444921875 0.444921875 
0.444876498 0.444876498 0.444876498 0.444876498 
0.444830965 0.444830965 0.444830965 0.444830965 
0.444785276 0.444785276 0.444785276 0.444785276 
0.44473943 0.44473943 0.44473943 0.44473943 
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Table 7.3: Budget afFects2, poor increase (Partial data) 
Differencel Difference? Differences Difference4 
0.445670225 0.445670225 0 0 • 
0.445627368 0.44562737 0 0 
0.445584384 0.445584384 0 0 
0.445541249 0.445541249 0 0 
0.44549797 0.44549797 0 0 
0.445454551 0.44545455 0 0 
0.445410983 0.445410982 0 () 
0.445367259 0.445367259 () 0 
0.445323395 0.445323395 0 0 
0.445279384 0.445279384 () () 
“ 0.445235225 0.445235225 0 0 
0.445190913 0.445190913 0 0 
0.445146454 0.445146454 0 0 
0.445101843 0.445101843 0 o 
0.44505708 0.44505708 0 0 
0.445012165 0.445012165 0 0 
�� 
0.444967097 ' 0.444967097 () q 
0.444921875 0.444921875 0 0 
‘ 0.444876498 0.444876498 0 0 
0.444830965 0.444830965 () 0 
0.444785276 0.444785276 0 0 
0.44473943 0.44473943 0 0 
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Table 7.4: Budget affects3, rich increase (Partial data) 
Differencel Difference2 Differences Difference4 
0 0 0.445670225 0.445670225 
0 0 0.445627384 0.445627293 
0 0 0.445584385 0.445584379 
0 0 0.445541249 0.44554125 
0 0 0.44549797 0.44549797 
0 0 0.445454541 0.445454602 一 
0 0 0.445410969 0.445411052 
0 0 0.445367259 0.445367259 
0 0 0.445323395 0.445323395 
0 • 0 0.445279383 0.445279391 
0 0 0.445235222 0.445235238 
0 0 0.445190914 0.445190913 
‘ 0 0 0.445146454 0.445146454 
0 0 0.445101843 0.445101843 
0 0 0.44505708 0.44505708 
0 0 0.445012165 0.445012165 
0 0 0.444967097 0.444967097 
0 0 0.444921875 0.444921875 
0 0 0.444876498 0.444876498 
0 0 0.444830965 0.444830965 
0 0 0.444785276 0.444785276 
0 0 0.44473943 0.44473943 
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if one investor in the group gets more budget, others will not care because the 




In this thesis, we extend the models of multi-period cooperative games of Zhou 
et al.([211) to the models with re-investment mechanisms and with stochastic 
budgets and stochastic project prices. On the other hand, We extend the 
models of Waegenaere et al. ([19]) to the stochastic cases with risks. Our 
main contributions are: 
1. We prove that the many models of Multi-period Cooperative Re-investment 
Games have non-empty cores. These models can be separated into two groups. 
The first one are models without risk measures in utility functions. The sec-
ond one are models with li risk measure and loo risk measure. Especially, 
we develop the "imaginary players" technique to prove the existence of core 
allocation for the models with stochastic budget variables. 
2. We provide an algorithm for solving the dual problem of the two-period 
case of models with stochastic return variables. Finding the allocation rule of 
cooperation, our algorithm has an time complexity of O(m^), which outper-
forms under the worst case. 
3. We also provide an algorithm for solving the dual problem of the two-
period case of models with stochastic budget variables. Again, the time com-
plexity is better than 0(m^.5). Moreover, we find some interesting marginal 
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effects by observing the algorithm. Under certain cases, although all players 
better off if budgets increase, the increase of returns only go to the contribu-
tors. 
4- By using MATLAB, we make an program to test the numerical per-
formance of cases with more than two periods and with two sets of investors, 
the rich one and the poor one. Through these numerical tests, we find some 
heuristic rules regarding how coefficient changes affect the cooperation of in-
vestors. 
There are still questions open for future research: 
1- In thesis, we only consider the discrete case of stochastic variables. For 
the case of continuously distribute stochastic variables, the non-emptyness of 
allocation rules is needed to be proven. 
‘ 2. Consider the case of discount factor not equal to 1. 
3. For models with more than two periods, algorithms for calculating 
the allocation rules are needed. Moreover, the time complexity should be 
controlled. 
4. Give theoretical explanations for the heuristic rules about marginal 
effects found in Chapter 7. 
�� 
Appendix A 
Original Data and Analysis for 
Section 7.1 (Partial) 
In this Chapter, the content in Table A.l to Table AA is part of the original 
data used in the numerical tests. The content in Table A.5 is the original 
results generated by the original data. The last table is the analysis to the 
original data. The analyzing target is as noted in Section 7.1. 
Table A.l: Original Data for Section 7.1 
space I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I 6 | 7 丨 8 | 9 丨 10 丨 11 | 12 
d l l 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
dl2 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 
dl3 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 
d21 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 
d22 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 
d23 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 
d31 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 
d32 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 
Continued... 
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space I 1 2 3 4 | 5 6 7 | 8 | 9 10 11 12 
d33 290 290 290 290 290 290 290 290 290 290 290 290 
d41 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
d42 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 
d43 270 270 270 270 270 270 270 270 270 270 270 270 
a l l 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
al2 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
al3 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
a21 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
a22 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
a23 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
a31 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
a32 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 
“ a33 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 
a41 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 
. a42 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 
a43 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 
r l l 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
r21 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
�� r31 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
r41 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
j l 2 5 5 • 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
r22 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
r32 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
r42 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
r l l + 20.5 20.6 20.7 20.8 20.9 21 21.1 21.2 21.3 21.4 21.5 21.6 
Continued... 
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space I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I 6 I 7 I 8 I 9 I 10 I 11 I 12 
r21+ 15.5 15.6 15.7 15.8 15.9 16 16.1 16.2 16.3 16.4 16.5 16.6 
r31+ 20.5 20.6 20.7 20.8 20.9 21 21.1 21.2 21.3 21.4 21.5 21.6 
r41+ 10.5 10.6 10.7 10.8 10.9 11 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 11.5 11.6 
rl2+ 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9 6 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 
r22+ 10.5 10.6 10.7 10.8 10.9 11 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 11.5 11.6 
r32+ 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.8 8.9 9 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5 9.6 
r42+ 15.5 15.6 15.7 15.8 15.9 16 16.1 16.2 16.3 16.4 16.5 16.6 
r l l - 19.5 19.4 19.3 19.2 19.1 19 18.9 18.8 18.7 18.6 18.5 18.4 
,21- 14.5 14.4 14.3 14.2 14.1 14 13.9 13.8 13.7 13.6 13.5 13.4 
r31- 19.5 19.4 19.3 19.2 19.1 19 18.9 18.8 18.7 18.6 18.5 18.4 
r41- 9.5 9.4 9.3 9.2 9.1 9 8.9 8.8 8.7 8.6 8.5 8.4 
rl2- 4.5 4.4 4.3 4.2 4.1 4 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.4 
r22- 9.5 9.4 9.3 9.2 9.1 9 8.9 8.8 8.7 8.6 8.5 8.4 
r32- 7.5 7.4 7.3 7.2 7.1 7 6.9 6.8 6.7 6.6 6.5 6.4 
r42- 14.5 14.4 14.3 14.2 14.1 14 13.9 13.8 13.7 13.6 13.5 13.4 
rl3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
r23 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
r33 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
r43 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 | 8 8 8 
Table A.2: Original Data for Section 7.1, Con't 
space I 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 卜 0 | 21 卜 2 | 23 | 24 
d l l 100 100 I 100 1100 I 100 I 100 I 100 I 100 I 100 100 100 100 
Continued.. • 
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space I 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 | 20 | 21 22 23 24 
dl2 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 
dl3 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 
d21 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 
d22 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 
d23 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 
d31 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 
d32 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 
d33 290 290 290 290 290 290 290 290 290 290 290 290 
d41 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
d42 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 
d43 270 270 270 270 270 270 270 270 270 270 270 270 
al l 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
_ al2 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
al3 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
. a21 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
a22 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
a23 10 .10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
a31 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
�� a32 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 
a33 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 
„ a41 56 56 ‘ 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 
a42 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 
a43 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 
r l l 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
r21 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Continued... 
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space I 13 I 14 I 15 I 16 I 17 I 18 I 19 I 20 I 21 I 22 I 23 I 24 
r31 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
r41 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
r l 2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
r22 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
r32 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
r42 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
r l l + 21.7 21.8 21.9 22 22.1 22.2 22.3 22.4 22.5 22.6 22.7 22.8 
r21+ 16.7 16.8 16.9 17 17.1 17.2 17.3 17.4 17.5 17.6 17.7 17.8 
r31+ 21.7 21.8 21.9 22 22.1 22.2 22.3 22.4 22.5 22.6 22.7 22.8 
r41+ 11.7 11.8 11.9 12 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.5 12.6 12.7 12.8 
rl2+ 6.7 6.8 6.9 7 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.8 
r22+ 11.7 11.8 11.9 12 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.5 12.6 12.7 12.8 
r32+ 9.7 9.8 9.9 10 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5 10.6 10.7 10.8 
r42+ 16.7 16.8 16.9 17 17.1 17.2 17.3 17.4 17.5 17.6 17.7 17.8 
r l l - -18.3 18.2 18.1 18 17.9 17.8 17.7 17.6 17.5 17.4 17.3 17.2 
r21- 13.3 13.2 13.1 13 12.9 12.8 12.7 12.6 12.5 12.4 12.3 12.2 
r31- 18.3 18.2 18.1 18 17.9 17.8 17.7 17.6 17.5 17.4 17.3 17.2 
r41- 8.3 8.2 8.1 8 7.9 7.8 7.7 7.6 7.5 7.4 7.3 7.2 
rl2- 3.3 3.2 3.1 3 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.2 
r22- 8.3 8.2 8.1 8 7.9 7.8 7.7 7.6 7.5 7.4 7.3 7.2 
r32- 6.3 6.2 6.1 6 5.9 5.8 5.7 5.6 5.5 5.4 5.3 5.2 
r42- 13.3 13.2 13.1 13 12.9 12.8 12.7 12.6 12.5 12.4 12.3 12.2 
rl3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
r23 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
r33 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
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space 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
r43 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
Table A.3: Original Data for Section 7.1, Con't 
space 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 
d l l 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
dl2 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 
dl3 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 
d21 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 
d22 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 
d23 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 
“ d31 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 
d32 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 
‘ d33 290 290 290 290 290 290 290 290 290 290 290 
d41 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
d42 180 isO 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 
d43 270 270 270 270 270 270 270 270 270 270 270 
a l l 5 5 5' 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
al2 7 7 . 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
' a l3 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
a21 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
a22 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
a23 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
a31 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
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space 25 I 26 I 27 I 28 I 29 I 30 I 31 I 32 I 33 I 34 35 
a32 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 
a33 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 
a41 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 
a42 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 
a43 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 
r l l 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
r21 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
r31 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
r41 10 10 10 10 10 . 10 10 10 10 10 10 
rl2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
r22 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
r32 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
r42 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
r l l + 22.9 23 23.1 23.2 23.3 23.4 23.5 23.6 23.7 23.8 23.9 
r21+ -17.9 18 18.1 18.2 18.3 18.4 18.5 18.6 18.7 18.8 18.9 
r31+ 22.9 23 23.1 23.2 23.3 23.4 23.5 23.6 23.7 23.8 23.9 
r41+ 12.9 13 13.1 13.2 13.3 13.4 13.5 13.6 13.7 13.8 13.9 
rl2+ 7.9 8 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.8 8.9 
r22+ 12.9 13 13.1 13.2 13.3 13.4 13.5 13.6 13.7 13.8 13.9 
r32+ 10.9 11 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 11.5 11.6 11.7 11.8 11.9 
r42+ 17.9 18 18.1 18.2 18.3 18.4 18.5 18.6 18.7 18.8 18.9 
r l l - 17.1 17 16.9 16.8 16.7 16.6 16.5 16.4 16.3 16.2 16.1 
r21- 12.1 12 11.9 11.8 11.7 11.6 11.5 11.4 11.3 11.2 11.1 
r31- 17.1 17 16.9 16.8 16.7 16.6 16.5 16.4 16.3 16.2 16.1 
r41- 7.1 7 6.9 6.8 6.7 6.6 6.5 6.4 6.3 6.2 6.1 
Continued... 
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space 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 
rl2- 2.1 2 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 
r22- 7.1 7 6.9 6.8 6.7 6.6 6.5 6.4 6.3 6.2 6.1 
r32- 5.1 5 4.9 4.8 4.7 4.6 4.5 4.4 4.3 4.2 4.1 
r42- 12.1 12 11.9 11.8 11.7 11.6 11.5 11.4 11.3 11:2 11.1 
rl3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
r23 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
r33 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
r43 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
Table A.4: Original Data for Section 7.1，Con't 
- space 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 
d l l 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
‘ dl2 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 
dl3 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 
d21 80 .80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 
d22 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 
d23 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 
d31 120 120 .120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 
'd32 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 
d33 290 290 290 290 290 290 290 290 290 290 290 
d41 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
d42 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 
d43 270 270 270 270 270 270 270 270 270 270 270 
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space I 36 I 37 I 38 I 39 I 40 I 41 | 42 丨 43 | 44 45 46 
all 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
al2 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
a l 3 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
a21 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
a22 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
a23 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
a31 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
a32 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 
a33 43 43 43 43 43 . 43 43 43 43 43 43 
a41 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 
a42 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 
a43 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 
r l l 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
r21 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
r31 - 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
r41 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
rl2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
r22 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
r32 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
r42 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
r l l + 24 24.1 24.2 24.3 24.4 24.5 24.6 24.7 24.8 24.9 25 
r21+ 19 19.1 19.2 19.3 19.4 19.5 19.6 19.7 19.8 19.9 20 
r31+ 24 24.1 24.2 24.3 24.4 24.5 24.6 24.7 24.8 24.9 25 
r41+ 14 14.1 14.2 14.3 14.4 14.5 14.6 14.7 14.8 14.9 15 
rl2+ 9 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5 9.6 9.7 9.8 9.9 10 
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space 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 
r22+ 14 14.1 14.2 14.3 14.4 14.5 14.6 14.7 14.8 14.9 15 
r32+ 12 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.5 12.6 12.7 12.8 12.9 13 
r42+ 19 19.1 19.2 19.3 19.4 19.5 19.6 19.7 19.8 19.9 20 
r l l - 16 15.9 15.8 15.7 15.6 15.5 15.4 15.3 15.2 15.1 15 
r21- 11 10.9 10.8 10.7 10.6 10.5 10.4 10.3 10.2 10.1 10 
r31- 16 15.9 15.8 15.7 15.6 15.5 15.4 15.3 15.2 15.1 15 
r41- 6 5.9 5.8 5.7 5.6 5.5 5.4 5.3 5.2 5.1 5 
rl2- 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 
r22- 6 5.9 5.8 5.7 5.6 5.5 5.4 5.3 5.2 5.1 5 
r32- 4 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.1 3 
r42- 11 10.9 10.8 10.7 10.6 10.5 10.4 10.3 10.2 10.1 10 
rl3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
- r23 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
r33 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
- r43 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
Table A.5: Original Results for Section 7.1 
space ul u2 u3 u4 
‘ 1 2.318505338 3.965954923 19.78469751 25.45338078 
2 2.318441077 3.965494307 19.78231938 25.45180621 
3 2.318376579 3.965032137 19.77993335 25.45022616 
4 2.318311874 3.964568431 19.77753934 25.44864092 
5 2.318246955 3.964103176 19.77513733 25.44705039 
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space ul u2 u3 u4 
6 2.318181818 3.963636364 19.77272727 25.44545455 
7 2.318116463 3.963167985 19.77030913 25.44385334 
8 2.318050888 3.962698032 19.76788286 25.44224676 
9 2.317985093 3.962226497 19.76544843 25.44063477 
10 2.31791908 3.961753376 19.76300578 25.43901739 
11 2.317852835 3.961278649 19.76055489 25.43739445 
12 2.31778637 3.96080232 19.7580957 25.43576607 
13 2.317719681 3.960324377 19.75562818 25.43413217 . 
14 2.317652764 3.959844811 19.75315228 25.43249273 
15 2.317585621 3.959363614 19.75066796 25.43084771 
16 2.317518248 3.958880779 19.74817518 25.42919708 
17 2.317450646 3.958396295 19.7456739 25.42754082 
18 2.317382813 3.957910156 19.74316406 25.42587891 
19 2.317314747 3.957422353 19.74064563 25.4242113 
.20 2.317246448 3.956932876 19.73811857 25.42253797 
21 2.317177914 3.956441718 19.73558282 25.4208589 
22 2.317109145 3.955948869 19.73303835 25.41917404 
23 2.317040138 3.955454322 19.7304851 25.41748338 
24 2.316970894 3.954958067 19.72792304 25.41578689 
25 2.31690141 3.954460095 19.72535211 25.41408452 
26 2.316831683 3.953960396 19.72277228 25.41237624 
27 2.316761719 3.953458966 19.72018348 25.41066207 
28 2.316691505 3.952955787 19.71758569 25.40894188 
29 2.31662105 3.952450858 19.71497885 25.40721573 
30 2.316550349 3.951944168 19.71236291 25.40548355 
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space ul u2 u3 u4 
31 2.316479401 3.951435705 19.70973783 25.40374532 
32 2.316408204 3.950925463 19.70710355 25.402001 
33 2.316336758 3.95041343 19.70446004 25.40025056 
34 2.31626506 3.949899598 19.70180723 25.39849398 
35 2.31619311 3.949383958 19.69914508 25.3967312 
36 2.316120907 3.948866499 19.69647355 25.39496222 
37 2.316048448 3.948347212 19.69379258 25.39318698 
38 2.315975733 3.947826087 19.69110212 25.39140546 
39 2.31590276 3.947303115 19.68840213 25.38961762 
40 2.315829528 3.946778285 19.68569254 25.38782344 
41 2.315756046 3.946251598 19.68297331 25.38602298 
42 2.315682281 3.945723014 19.6802444 25.38421589 
一 43 2.315608267 3.945192555 19.67750573 25.38240249 
44 2,315533981 3.944660194 19.67475728 25.38058252 
. 45 2.315459432 3.944125928 19.67199898 25.37875608 
46 2.315384631 3.943589753 19.66923072 25.37692323 
�� Table A.6: Data, Analysis 1 for Section 7.1 
- space difference 1 difference2 differences difference4 
1 6.42609E-05 0.000460616 0.002378129 0.001574575 
2 6.44982E-05 0.00046217 0.002386033 0.001580052 
3 6.47048E-05 0.000463706 0.002394005 0.001585241 
4 6.49192E-05 0.000465255 0.002402012 0.001590522 
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space differencel difference� differences difference4 
5 6.51367E-05 0.000466813 0.002410057 0.001595849 
6 6.53552E-05 0.000468379 0.002418143 0.001601203 
7 6.55748E-05 0.000469953 0.002426269 0.001606583 
8 6.57955E-05 0.000471535 0.002434436 0.001611991 
9 6.6013E-05 0.000473121 0.002442648 0.001617382 
10 6.62448E-05 0.000474727 0.002450891 0.001622935 
11 6.64645E-05 0.000476329 0.002459187 0.001628381 
12 6.66897E-05 0.000477943 0.002467521 0.001633899 
13 6.69162E-05 0.000479566 0.002475898 0.001639446 
14 6.71437E-05 0.000481197 0.002484317 0.001645021 
15 6.73724E-05 0.000482836 0.00249278 0.001650624 
16 6.76023E-05 0.000484483 0.002501285 0.001656256 
17 6.78334E-05 0.000486139 0.002509835 0.001661917 
18 6.80656E-05 0.000487804 0.002518428 0.001667607 
.19 6.8299E-05 0.000489477 0.002527065 0.001673327 
20 6.85337E-05 0.000491158 0.002535747 0.001679076 
21 6.87696E-05 0.000492849 0.002544474 0.001684854 
22 6.90066E-05 0.000494548 0.002553246 0.001690663 
23 6.92442E-05 0.000496255 0.002562064 0.001696494 
24 6.94843E-05 0.000497972 0.002570926 0.001702368 
25 6.97263E-05 0.000499699 0.002579835 0.00170828 
26 6.99642E-05 0.00050143 0.002588794 0.001714169 
27 7.02138E-05 0.000503179 0.00259779 0.001720192 
28 7.04552E-05 0.000504929 0.002606843 0.001726152 
29 7.0701E-05 0.000506691 0.002615939 0.001732175 
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space differencel difference? differences difference4 
30 7.09483E-05 0.000508462 0.002625084 0.001738232 
31 7.11966E-05 0.000510243 0.002634276 0.001744318 
32 7.14464E-05 0.000512033 0.002643517 0.001750437 
33 7.16975E-05 0.000513832 0.002652806 0.001756588 
34 7.19499E-05 0.000515641 0.002662145 0.001762771 
35 7.22036E-05 0.000517459 0.002671533 0.001768988 
36 7.24587E-05 0.000519287 0.00268097 0.001775237 
37 7.27151E-05 0.000521125 0.002690458 0.00178152 
38 7.29729E-05 0.000522972 0.002699996 0.001787835 
39 7.3232E-05 0.00052483 0.002709585 0.001794185 
40 7.34823E-05 0.000526688 0.002719233 0.001800462 
41 7.37647E-05 0.000528583 0.002728909 0.001807091 
. 42 7.40137E-05 0.000530459 0.002738668 0.0018134 
43 7.42868E-05 0.000532361 0.00274845 0.001819962 
. 44 7.45488E-05 0.000534266 0.002758305 0.001826445 
45 7.48012E-05 0.000536175 0.002768256 0.001832853 
�� Table A.7: Data, Analysis 1 for Section 7.1 
" - space differencel difference? differences difference4 
1 3.57005E-06 1.70599E-05 1.87254E-05 8.28724E-06 
2 3.58323E-06 1.71174E-05 1.87877E-05 8.31606E-06 
3 3.59471E-06 1.71743E-05 1.88504E-05 8.34337E-06 
4 3.60662E-06 1.72317E-05 1.89135E-05 8.37117E-06 
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space difference! difference? difference� difference4 
5 3.6187E-06 1.72894E-05 1.89768E-05 8.3992E-06 
6 3.63084E-06 1.73474E-05 1.90405E-05 8.42738E-06 
7 3.64305E-06 1.74057E-05 1.91045E-05 8.4557E-06 
8 3.65531E-06 1.74643E-05 1.91688E-05 8.48416E-06 
9 3.66739E-06 1.7523E-05 1.92335E-05 8.51254E-06 
10 3.68027E-06 1.75825E-05 1.92984E-05 8.54176E-06 
11 3.69247E-06 1.76418E-05 1.93637E-05 8.57042E-06 
12 3.70499E-06 1.77016E-05 1.94293E-05 8.59947E-06 . 
13 3.71756E-06 1.77617E-05 1.94953E-05 8.62866E-06 
14 3.73021E-06 1.78221E-05 1.95616E-05 8.658E-06 
15 3.74291E-06 1.78828E-05 1.96282E-05 8.6875E-06 
16 3.75568E-06 1.79438E-05 1.96952E-05 8.71714E-06 
17 3.76852E-06 1.80052E-05 1.97625E-05 8.74693E-06 
18 3.78142E-06 1.80668E-05 1.98301E-05 8.77688E-06 
•19 3.79439E-06 1.81288E-05 1.98982E-05 8.80698E-06 
20 3.80743E-06 1.8191E-05 1.99665E-05 8.83724E-06 
21 3.82053E-06 1.82537E-05 2.00352E-05 8.86765E-06 
22 3.8337E-06 1.83166E-05 2.01043E-05 8.89822E-06 
23 3.8469E-06 1.83798E-05 2.01737E-05 8.92891E-06 
24 3.86024E-06 1.84434E-05 2.02435E-05 8.95983E-06 
25 3.87369E-06 1.85074E-05 2.03137E-05 8.99095E-06 
26 3.8869E-06 1.85715E-05 2.03842E-05 9.02194E-06 
27 3.90077E-06 1.86362E-05 2.0455E-05 9.05364E-06 
28 3.91418E-06 1.87011E-05 2.05263E-05 9.08501E-06 
29 3.92783E-06 1.87663E-05 2.05979E-05 9.11671E-06 
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space difference 1 difference? differences difference4 
30 3.94157E-06 1.88319E-05 2.06699E-05 9.14859E-06 
31 3.95537E-06 1.88979E-05 2.07423E-05 9.18062E-06 
32 3.96924E-06 1.89642E-05 2.08151E-05 9.21282E-06 
33 3.98319E-06 1.90308E-05 2.08882E-05 9.2452E-06 
34 3.99721E-06 1.90978E-05 2.09618E-05 9.27774E-06 
35 4.01131E-06 1.91651E-05 2.10357E-05 9.31046E-06 
36 4.02548E-06 1.92329E-05 2.111E-05 9.34335E-06 
37 4.03973E-06 1.93009E-05 2.11847E-05 9.37642E-06 
38 4.05405E-06 1.93693E-05 2.12598E-05 9.40966E-06 
39 4.06845E-06 1.94381E-05 2.13353E-05 9.44308E-06 
40 4.08235E-06 1.95069E-05 2.14113E-05 9.47612E-06 
41 4.09804E-06 1.95772E-05 2.14875E-05 9.511E-06 
” 42 4.11187E-06 1.96466E-05 2.15643E-05 9.54421E-06 
43 4.12704E-06 1.97171E-05 2.16413E-05 9.57875E-06 
44 4.1416E-06 1.97876E-05 2.17189E-05 9.61287E-06 
45 4.15562E-06 1.98583E-05 2.17973E-05 9.64659E-06 
Appendix B 
Data Analysis for Section 
7.2(Partial) 
In this Chapter, we ignore the original data part. The content in Table B.l 
is the original results generated by the original data. The last table is the 
analysis to the original data. The analyzing target is as noted in Section 7.2. 
Table B.l: Data, Analysis for Section 7.2, (all increase) 
space differencel difference� differences difference4 
1 0.445670225 0.445670225 0.445670225 0.445670225 
2 0.445627365 0.445627367 0.445627387 0.445627263 
3 0.445584384 0.445584384 0.445584386 0.445584375 
4 0.445541249 0.445541249 0.445541249 0.445541249 
5 0.44549797 0.44549797 0.44549797 0.44549797 
6 0.445454545 0.445454545 0.445454545 0.445454545 
7 0.445410975 0.445410975 0.445410975 0.445410975 
8 0.445367259 0.445367259 0.445367259 0.445367259 
9 0.445323395 0.445323395 0.445323395 0.445323396 
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space difference 1 difference� differences difference4 
10 0.445279395 0.445279394 0.445279375 0.445279498 
11 0.445235223 0.445235223 0.445235223 0.445235223 
12 0.445190913 0.445190913 0.445190914 0.445190913 
13 0.445146454 0.445146454 0.445146454 0.445146454 
14 0.445101843 0.445101843 0.445101843 0.445101843 
15 0.44505708 0.44505708 0.44505708 0.44505708 
16 0.445012165 0.445012165 0.445012165 0.445012165 
17 0.444967097 0.444967097 0.444967097 0.444967097 
18 0.444921875 0.444921875 0.444921875 0.444921875 
19 0.444876498 0.444876498 0.444876498 0.444876498 
20 0.444830965 0.444830965 0.444830965 0.444830965 
21 0.444785276 0.444785276 0.444785276 0.444785276 
„ 22 0.44473943 0.44473943 0.44473943 0.44473943 
23 0.444693425 0.444693425 0.444693425 0.444693425 
. 24 0.444647261 0.444647261 0.444647262 0.444647254 
25 0.444600938 0.444600938 0.444600939 0.44460093 
26 0.444554456 0.444554456 0.444554455 0.444554466 
27 0.444507824 0.444507824 0.444507808 0.444507944 
* 28 0.444461004 0.444461004 0.444461003 0.444461004 
29 0.444414036 0.444414035 0.444414031 0.444414059 
- - 30 0.444366899 0.444366899 0.444366899 0.444366899 
31 0.444319602 0.444319602 0.4443196 0.444319615 
32 0.444272136 0.444272136 0.444272136 0.444272137 
33 0.444224508 0.444224508 0.444224503 0.444224536 
34 0.444176707 0.444176707 0.444176707 0.444176707 
Continued... 
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space differencel difference� differences difference4 
35 0.44412874 0.44412874 0.44412874 0.44412874 
36 0.444080605 0.444080605 0.444080604 0.444080604 
37 0.444032299 0.444032299 0.444032299 0.444032299 
38 0.443983822 0.443983822 0.443983822 0.443983823 
39 0.443935174 0.443935174 0.443935173 0.443935175 
40 0.443886352 0.443886352 0.443886352 0.443886353 
41 0.443837347 0.443837348 0.443837365 0.443837256 
42 0.443788204 0.443788198 0.443788149 0.443788349 . 
43 0.443738851 0.443738848 0.443738813 0.443738934 
44 0.443689334 0.443689329 0.44368928 0.443689452 
45 0.443639631 0.443639627 0.443639592 0.443639718 
46 0.443589735 0.443589739 0.443589776 0.443589656 
Appendix C 
Data Analysis for Section 
7.3(Partial) 
In this Chapter, we ignore the original data part. The content in Table C.l 
is the original results generated by the original data. The last table is the 
analysis to the original data. The analyzing target is as noted in Section 7.3. 
Table C.l: Original Results for Section 7.3, (poor in-
crease) 
space ul u2 u3 u4 
� 1 2.318505338 3.965954923 19.78469751 25.45338078 
2 2.318441077 3.965494307 19.78231938 25.45180621 
.. , 3 2.318376579 3.965032137 19.77993335 25.45022616 
4 2.318311874 3.964568431 19.77753934 25.44864092 
5 2.318246955 3.964103176 19.77513733 25.44705039 
6 2.318181818 3.963636364 19.77272727 25.44545455 
7 2.318116463 3.963167985 19.77030913 25.44385334 
8 2.318050888 3.962698032 19.76788286 25.44224676 
Continued... 
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space ul u2 u3 u4 
9 2.317985093 3.962226497 19.76544843 25.44063477 
10 2.31791908 3.961753376 19.76300578 25.43901739 
11 2.317852835 3.961278649 19.76055489 25.43739445 
12 2.31778637 3.96080232 19.7580957 25.43576607 
13 2.317719681 3.960324377 19.75562818 25.43413217 
14 2.317652764 3.959844811 19.75315228 25.43249273 
15 2.317585621 3.959363614 19.75066796 25.43084771 
16 2.317518248 3.958880779 19.74817518 25.42919708 
17 2.317450646 3.958396295 19.7456739 25.42754082 
18 2.317382813 3.957910156 19.74316406 25.42587891 
19 2.317314747 3.957422353 19.74064563 25.4242113 
20 2.317246448 3.956932876 19.73811857 25.42253797 
21 2.317177914 3.956441718 19.73558282 25.4208589 
22 2.317109145 3.955948869 19.73303835 25.41917404 
.23 2.317040138 3.955454322 19.7304851 25.41748338 
24 2.316970894 3.954958067 19.72792304 25.41578689 
25 2.31690141 3.954460095 19.72535211 25.41408452 
26 2.316831683 3.953960396 19.72277228 25.41237624 
27 2.316761719 3.953458966 19.72018348 25.41066207 
28 2.316691505 3.952955787 19.71758569 25.40894188 
29 2.31662105 3.952450858 19.71497885 25.40721573 
30 2.316550349 3.951944168 19.71236291 25.40548355 
31 2.316479401 3.951435705 19.70973783 25.40374532 
32 2.316408204 3.950925463 19.70710355 25.402001 
33 2.316336758 3.95041343 19.70446004 25.40025056 
Continued... 
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space ul u2 u3 u4 
34 2.31626506 3.949899598 19.70180723 25.39849398 
35 2.31619311 3.949383958 19.69914508 25.3967312 
36 2.316120907 3.948866499 19.69647355 25.39496222 
37 2.316048448 3.948347212 19.69379258 25.39318698 
38 2.315975733 3.947826087 19.69110212 25.39140546 
39 2.31590276 3.947303115 19.68840213 25.38961762 
40 2.315829528 3.946778285 19.68569254 25.38782344 
41 2.315756046 3.946251598 19.68297331 25.38602298 
42 2.315682281 3.945723014 19.6802444 25.38421589 
43 2.315608267 3.945192555 19.67750573 25.38240249 
44 2.315533981 3.944660194 19.67475728 25.38058252 
45 2.315459432 3.944125928 19.67199898 25.37875608 
. 46 2.315384631 3.943589753 19.66923072 25.37692323 
47 2.764175563 4.411625148 19.78469751 25.45338078 
. 48 2.764068445 4.411121676 19.78231939 25.45180612 
49 2.763960963 4.410616521 19.77993335 25.45022615 
50 2.763853124 4.410109681 19.77753934 25.44864092 
51 2.763744925 4.409601146 19.77513733 25.44705039 
- 52 2.763636369 4.409090914 19.77272727 25.4454546 
53 2.763527446 4.408578967 19.77030912 25.44385342 
•  - 54 2.763418147 4.40806529 19.76788286 25.44224676 
55 2.763308488 4.407549892 19.76544843 25.44063477 
56 2.763198464 4.40703276 19.76300578 25.43901739 
57 2.763088059 4.406513874 19.76055488 25.43739447 
58 2.762977284 4.405993233 19.7580957 25.43576607 
Continued... 
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space ul u2 u3 u4 
59 2.762866134 4.40547083 19.75562818 25.43413217 
60 2.762754607 4.404946654 19.75315228 25.43249273 
61 2.762642701 4.404420695 19.75066796 25.43084771 
62 2.762530414 4.403892944 19.74817518 25.42919708 
63 2.762417743 4.403363393 19.7456739 25.42754082 
64 2.762304688 4.402832031 19.74316406 25.42587891 
65 2.762191245 4.402298851 19.74064563 25.4242113 
66 2.762077413 4.401763841 19.73811857 25.42253797 . 
67 2.76196319 4.401226994 19.73558282 25.4208589 
68 2.761848574 4.400688299 19.73303835 25.41917404 
69 2.761733563 4.400147747 19.7304851 25.41748338 
70 2.761618155 4.399605328 19.72792304 25.41578688 
71 2.761502348 4.399061034 19.72535211 25.41408452 
72 2.761386146 4.398514858 19.72277227 25.41237631 
.73 2.761269526 4.397966774 19.72018349 25.41066204 
74 2.761152512 4.397416793 19.71758569 25.40894191 
75 2.761035083 4.396864892 19.71497885 25.40721573 
76 2.760917248 4.396311067 19.71236291 25.40548355 
77 2.760799001 4.395755306 19.70973783 25.40374532 
78 2.760680346 4.395197604 19.70710355 25.40200106 
79 2.760561263 4.394637935 19.70446004 25.40025056 
80 2.760441767 4.394076305 19.70180723 25.39849398 
81 2.760321851 4.393512698 19.69914508 25.3967312 
82 2.760201511 4.392947103 19.69647355 25.39496222 
83 2.760080747 4.39237951 19.69379258 25.39318698 
Continued... 
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space ul u2 u3 u4 
84 2.759959555 4.391809909 19.69110212 25.39140546 
85 2.759837944 4.391238298 19.68840212 25.38961773 
86 2.75971589 4.390664646 19.68569253 25.38782354 
87 2.759593393 4.390088945 19.68297332 25.38602287 
88 2.759470468 4.389511202 19.6802444 25.38421589 
89 2.759347105 4.388931395 19.67750574 25.38240245 
90 2.759223301 4.388349515 19.67475728 25.38058252 
91 2.759099069 4.387765559 19.67199892 25.37875624 
92 2.758974368 4.387179493 19.66923074 25.37692317 
Table C.2: Data Analysis for Section 7.3 (poor increase) 
space difference! difference2 differences difference4 
• 1 0.445670225 0.445670225 0 0 
2 0.445627368 0.44562737 0 0 
3 0.445584384 0.445584384 0 0 
4 0.445541249 0.445541249 0 0 
5 0.44549797 0.44549797 0 0 
6 0.445454551 0.44545455 0 0 
‘ 7 0.445410983 0.445410982 0 0 
8 0.445367259 0.445367259 0 0 
9 0.445323395 0.445323395 0 0 
10 0.445279384 0.445279384 0 0 
11 0.445235225 0.445235225 0 0 
Continued... 
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space differencel difference] differences difference4 
12 0.445190913 0.445190913 0 0 
13 0.445146454 0.445146454 0 0 
14 0.445101843 0.445101843 0 0 
15 0.44505708 0.44505708 0 0 
16 0.445012165 0.445012165 0 0 
17 0.444967097 0.444967097 0 0 
18 0.444921875 0.444921875 0 0 
19 0.444876498 0.444876498 0 0 -
20 0.444830965 0.444830965 0 0 
21 0.444785276 0.444785276 0 0 
22 0.44473943 0.44473943 0 0 
23 0.444693425 0.444693425 0 0 
24 0.444647261 0.444647261 0 0 
25 0.444600939 0.444600939 0 0 
- 2 6 0.444554463 0.444554462 0 0 
27 0.444507807 0.444507808 0 0 
28 0.444461006 0.444461006 0 0 
29 0.444414033 0.444414033 0 0 
30 0.444366899 0.444366899 0 0 
31 0.444319601 0.444319601 0 0 
32 0.444272142 0.444272142 0 0 
33 0.444224505 0.444224505 0 0 
34 0.444176707 0.444176707 0 0 
35 0.44412874 0.44412874 0 0 
36 0.444080605 0.444080605 0 0 
Continued... 
Appendix /i Original Data and Analysis for Section 7.1 (Partial) 104 
space difference 1 difference? differences difference4 
37 0.444032299 0.444032299 0 0 
38 0.443983822 0.443983822 0 0 
39 0.443935184 0.443935183 0 0 
40 0.443886362 0.443886361 0 0 “ 
41 0.443837347 0.443837348 0 0 
42 0.443788187 0.443788187 0 0 
43 0.443738838 0.44373884 0 0 
44 0.44368932 0.44368932 0 0 
45 0.443639637 0.443639631 0 0 
46 0.443589738 0.44358974 0 0 
Table C.3: Original Data, for Section 7.3, (rich increase) 
‘ space ul u2 u3 u4 
1 2.318505338 3.965954923 19.78469751 25.45338078 
2 ^318441077 3.965494307 19.78231938 25.45180621 
3 2.318376579 3.965032137 19.77993335 25.45022616 
4 2.318311874 3.964568431 19.77753934 25.44864092 
5 2.318246955 3.964103176 19.77513733 25.44705039 
‘ 6 2.318181818 3.963636364 19.77272727 25.44545455 
7 2.318116463 3.963167985 19.77030913 25.44385334 
8 2.318050888 3.962698032 19.76788286 25.44224676 
9 2.317985093 3.962226497 19.76544843 25.44063477 
10 2.31791908 3.961753376 19.76300578 25.43901739 
Continued... 
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space ul u2 \i4 
11 2.317852835 3.961278649 19.76055489 25.43739445 
12 2.31778637 3.96080232 19.7580957 25.43576607 
13 2.317719681 3.960324377 19.75562818 25.43413217 
14 2.317652764 3.959844811 19.75315228 25.43249273 
15 2.317585621 3.959363614 19.75066796 25.43084771 
16 2.317518248 3.958880779 19.74817518 25.42919708 
17 2.317450646 3.958396295 19.7456739 25.42754082 
18 2.317382813 3.957910156 19.74316406 25.42587891 , 
19 2.317314747 3.957422353 19.74064563 25.4242113 
20 2.317246448 3.956932876 19.73811857 25.42253797 
21 2.317177914 3.956441718 19.73558282 25.4208589 
22 2.317109145 3.955948869 19.73303835 25.41917404 
23 2.317040138 3.955454322 19.7304851 25.41748338 
24 2.316970894 3.954958067 19.72792304 25.41578689 
•25 2.31690141 3.954460095 19.72535211 25.41408452 
26 2.316831683 3.953960396 19.72277228 25.41237624 
27 2.316761719 3.953458966 19.72018348 25.41066207 
28 2.316691505 3.952955787 19.71758569 25.40894188 
29 2.31662105 3.952450858 19.71497885 25.40721573 
30 2.316550349 3.951944168 19.71236291 25.40548355 
31 2.316479401 3.951435705 19.70973783 25.40374532 
32 2.316408204 3.950925463 19.70710355 25.402001 
33 2.316336758 3.95041343 19.70446004 25.40025056 
34 2.31626506 3.949899598 19.70180723 25.39849398 
35 2.31619311 3.949383958 19.69914508 25.3967312 
Continued... 
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space ul u2 u3 u4 
36 2.316120907 3.948866499 19.69647355 25.39496222 
37 2.316048448 3.948347212 19.69379258 25.39318698 
38 2.315975733 3.947826087 19.69110212 25.39140546 
39 2.31590276 3.947303115 19.68840213 25.38961762 
40 2.315829528 3.946778285 19.68569254 25.38782344 
41 2.315756046 3.946251598 19.68297331 25.38602298 
42 2.315682281 3.945723014 19.6802444 25.38421589 
43 2.315608267 3.945192555 19.67750573 25.38240249 
44 2.315533981 3.944660194 19.67475728 25.38058252 
45 2.315459432 3.944125928 19.67199898 25.37875608 
46 2.315384631 3.943589753 19.66923072 25.37692323 
47 2.318505338 3.965954923 20.23036773 25.89905101 
„ 48 2.318441069 3.9654943 20.22794676 25.8974335 
49 2.318376578 3.965032136 20.22551773 25.89581054 
. 50 2.318311874 3.964568431 20.22308059 25.89418217 
51 2.318246955 3.964103176 20.2206353 25.89254836 
52 2.318181824 3.963636368 20.21818181 25.89090915 
53 2.318116471 3.963167991 20.2157201 25.8892644 
�� 54 2.318050888 3.962698032 20.21325012 25.88761402 
55 2.317985093 3.962226497 20.21077182 25.88595816 
, 56 2.31791908 3.961753376 20.20828516 25.88429678 
57 2.317852836 3.96127865 20.20579011 25.88262969 
58 2.31778637 3.96080232 20.20328661 25.88095698 
59 2.317719681 3.960324377 20.20077463 25.87927863 
60 2.317652764 3.959844811 20.19825412 25.87759457 
Continued... 
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space ul u2 u3 u4 
61 2.317585621 3.959363614 20.19572504 25.87590479 
62 2.317518248 3.958880779 20.19318735 25.87420925 
63 2.317450646 3.958396295 20.19064099 25.87250792 
64 2.317382813 3.957910156 20.18808594 25.87080078 
65 2.317314747 3.957422353 20.18552213 25.8690878 
66 2.317246448 3.956932876 20.18294953 25.86736894 
67 2.317177914 3.956441718 20.1803681 25.86564417 
68 2.317109145 3.955948869 20.17777778 25.86391347 
69 2.317040138 3.955454322 20.17517853 25.86217681 
70 2.316970893 3.954958066 20.1725703 25.86043414 
71 2.316901409 3.954460095 20.16995305 25.85868546 
72 2.31683169 3.953960403 20.16732673 25.85693077 
73 2.316761716 3.953458964 20.1646913 25.85516985 
74 2.316691508 3.95295579 20.16204669 25.85340291 
•75 2.31662105 3.952450858 20.15939288 25.85162976 
76 2.316550349 3.951944168 20.15672981 25.84985045 
77 2.316479401 3.951435706 20.15405743 25.84806492 
78 2.31640821 3.950925468 20.15137568 25.8462732 
79 2.316336758 3.95041343 20.14868454 25.84447507 
80 2.31626506 3.949899598 20.14598394 25.84267068 
81 2.31619311 3.949383958 20.14327382 25.84085994 
82 2.316120907 3.948866499 20.14055416 25.83904282 
83 2.316048448 3.948347212 20.13782488 25.83721928 
84 2.315975733 3.947826087 20.13508595 25.83538928 
85 2.31590277 3.947303124 20.13233729 25.8335529 
Continued... 
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space ul u2 u3 u4 
86 2.315829538 3.946778294 20.12957889 25.83170989 
87 2.315756036 3.946251588 20.12681067 25.82986023 
88 2.315682281 3.945723014 20.12403259 25.82800407 
89 2.315608263 3.945192553 20.12124458 25.82614129 
90 2.315533981 3.944660194 20.1184466 25.82427184 
91 2.315459448 3.944125938 20.11563855 25.82239586 
92 2.315384625 3.94358975 20.11282049 25.82051291 
Table C.4: Data Analysis for Section 7.3, (rich increase) 
space differencel difference2 differences difFerence4 
“ 1 0 0 0.445670225 0.445670225 
2 0 0 0.445627384 0.445627293 
3 0 0 0.445584385 0.445584379 
4 0 0 0.445541249 0.44554125 
5 0 0 0.44549797 0.44549797 
6 0 0 0.445454541 0.445454602 
7 0 ' 0 0.445410969 0.445411052 
8 .0 0 0.445367259 0.445367259 
‘ 9 0 0 0.445323395 0.445323395 
10 0 0 0.445279383 0.445279391 
11 0 0 0.445235222 0.445235238 
12 0 0 0.445190914 0.445190913 
13 0 0 0.445146454 0.445146454 
Continued... 
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space differencel difference� differences difference4 
14 0 0 0.445101843 0.445101843 
15 0 0 0.44505708 0.44505708 
16 0 0 0.445012165 0.445012165 
17 0 0 0.444967097 0.444967097 
18 0 0 0.444921875 0.444921875 
19 0 0 0.444876498 0.444876498 
20 0 0 0.444830965 0.444830965 
21 0 0 0.444785276 0.444785276 . 
22 0 0 . 0.44473943 0.44473943 
23 0 0 0.444693425 0.444693425 
24 0 0 0.444647262 0.444647254 
25 0 0 0.444600939 0.444600938 
26 0 0 0.444554453 0.444554529 
27 0 0 0.444507814 0.44450778 
. 2 8 0 0 0.444461001 0.444461031 
29 0 0 0.444414033 0.444414033 
30 0 0 0.444366899 0.444366899 
31 0 0 0.4443196 0.444319602 
32 0 0 0.444272133 0.444272195 
33 0 0 0.444224505 0.444224505 
34 0 0 0.444176707 0.444176707 
35 0 0 0.44412874 0.44412874 
36 0 0 0.444080604 0.444080604 
37 0 0 0.444032299 0.444032299 
38 0 0 0.443983822 0.443983822 
Continued... 
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space differencel difference� differences difference4 
39 0 0 0.443935166 0.443935278 
40 0 0 0.443886345 0.44388645 
41 0 0 0.443837365 0.443837252 
42 0 0 0.443788187 0.443788187 
43 0 0 0.443738849 0.443738804 
44 0 0 0.44368932 0.44368932 
45 0 0 0.44363957 0.443639778 
46 0 0 0.443589765 0.443589687 
f 
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